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Singer Tom Petty once warbled that the waiting is the hardest part. Now that wait is 
finally over for many mutual-fund managers. That is because 2007 marks a 
milestone that could greatly help their funds: It will have been five long years since 
the late-2002 bear-market bottom. This means that five-year performance numbers 
no longer will reflect the market's steep slide. Instead, they will capture the market's 
upswing since then. Funds took the brunt of the dot-com bust at different times. 
January 2002, for instance, was a particular low for Old Mutual Focused Fund, 
which had a sinking, large position in Adelphia Communications Corp., a cable 
company that eventually filed for bankruptcy-court protection. "I'm very anxious to 
roll off that quarter specifically," says Jerome Heppelmann, manager of the fund. Its 
five-year annualized return has more than doubled to 6.4% through December 2006, 
compared with a 2.8%-a-year gain at the end of 2005.
 1
 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the most persistent and robust patterns documented in the mutual fund literature is 
return-chasing by investors.2 The disproportional allocation of wealth to funds with superior 
performance in prior periods transcends mutual fund asset classes, country boundaries, and 
investment objectives. Given the limited evidence of persistence in mutual fund performance 
(Berk and Green, 2004), this trend is largely described in the popular press as irrational. For 
example, on the heels of the 1999 bull market, concerns regarding the potentially detrimental 
impacts of return-chasing led then Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur 
Levitt to caution investors against this practice, stating “Chasing fund performance is often the 
quickest way to hurt your mutual fund returns”.3  
In this paper, we examine a different type of return-chasing behavior. Without exception, 
the return-chasing literature has focused on investor reaction to the most recent fund return. We 
analyze whether investors chase stale fund returns, returns arising from horizon effects in 
holding period returns (HPR), the standard format of performance reporting. Due to either 
                                                           
1 Diya Gullappalli, The mutual-funds eraser, Wall Street Journal, January 26, 2007. 
2 For example, Barber, Odean and Zheng (2000) report that over half of all fund purchases are of funds ranked in the 
top quintile of prior annual returns. Also see Ippolito (1992); Chevalier and Ellison (1997); Sirri and Tufano (1998); 
Lynch and Musto (2003) and Karceski (2002). 
3 SEC press release 2000-7, New SEC mutual fund tips remind investors to look at more than short-term past 
performance. 
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naïvety or limited attention, investors appear unable to distinguish between the new and stale 
components of changes in HPRs when making allocations, and misconstrue the changes in 
returns as new information regarding manager ability and future fund performance. We 
document how this stale return-chasing effect is used by funds to attract investor allocations and 
set fees and argue that this type of behavior is part of a general class of horizon effects that have 
implications for other areas of finance including the asset pricing literature.  
Specifically, when advertising past performance, Rule 482 of the Securities Act of 1933 
requires investment companies to report past performance in the form of an HPR over horizons 
of 1, 5, and 10 years for funds in existence over those horizons. The horizon must be at least one 
year long and must end with the latest calendar quarter. These requirements are designed to 
standardize performance reporting across funds and ensure that fund managers are not selecting 
arbitrary horizons to maximize their reported performance. Investment companies are free to 
report other horizons as long as their prominence is not greater than the required horizons. In 
particular, as a matter of convention, mutual funds typically also report the 3-year HPR, perhaps 
because mutual fund rating agencies such as Morningstar or Lipper also rank funds on the basis 
of their past 1, 3, 5, and 10 year HPRs.  
The focus of our analysis is how investors interpret the change in reported HPRs. For 
example, consider the following 5 quarter return time series: 
  
Period -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 
Return -2% 3% 4% 5% -4% 
The annual HPR for quarters -2 to -5 is 8% and the corresponding annual HPR for quarters -1 
to -4 is 10%:  
 = 1 + −0.021 + 0.031 + 0.041 + 0.05− 1 = 0.102 
 = 1 + 0.031 + 0.041 + 0.051 + −0.04− 1 = 0.079 
Even though the fund experienced a negative return in the most recent period (t=-1), the HPR 
increased as the end-return which dropped from the sample was more negative. The change in 
the HPR is therefore a function of the most recent return (-2%) which enters the horizon and the 
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end-return (-4%) which drops from the horizon. As all other intervening returns are common in 
the return sequences, they have no influence on the change in the HPR. Thus, the change in HPR 
is influenced only by new information (reflected in the most recent fund return), and stale 
information (reflected in the end-return that was reported to investors four quarters previously). 
As illustrated by the introductory quote, mutual fund managers appear to view the stale 
information component impounded in the change in the HPR as an important influence on 
investor behavior. The manager quoted is “anxious to roll off” a quarter with particularly poor 
performance. In other words, the manager anticipates an improvement in the fund’s reported 
performance because a negative end-return drops from the horizon of the HPR calculation. 
However, the improvement in the reported HPR implies only that immediate performance was 
less negative than the quarter being rolled off. After controlling for the most recent return, the 
change in the HPR does not provide any new or relevant information regarding future fund 
performance. To our knowledge, the extent to which stale returns influence investor behavior has 
yet to be explored. 
If investors have access to the entire time series of fund returns, the change in the HPR 
can easily be decomposed into new and stale information components. It is plausible that at least 
some investors have access to this information. Our analysis spans the period of 1992 to 2010, 
during which the availability of mutual fund information expanded dramatically, evolving from 
paper disclosures by mutual funds to the SEC to electronic availability of mutual fund 
disclosures and related data via EDGAR and data providers such as Morningstar. However, we 
argue that they do not necessarily use this information. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) argue that 
investors have limited attention and processing power and potentially lack the sophistication to 
interpret the disclosed information. In our setting, regardless of the availability of past returns, 
investors are overwhelmed by the volume of public information available to assess mutual fund 
quality and thus gravitate to information that is presented in a salient, easily processed form. 
Further, it is not clear that the average retail investor understands the manner in which HPRs are 
calculated and consequently the influence of stale information when evaluating the time series of 
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HPRs. The computation procedure is not reported and only investors with some level of finance 
education would understand the nuances of performance reporting.  
 We document three results in the paper. First, analyzing investor allocations, we find that 
investors appear unable to differentiate between the new and stale information components of 
performance reported by mutual funds. It is well understood that investors “chase” past 
performance, allocating disproportional wealth to funds with strong recent performance. Our 
results suggest that investors react with equal vigor to the stale information component of HPRs. 
In other words, investors direct disproportionate flows to funds which realize improved HPRs 
due to end-returns dropping from the horizon of HPR calculations. Second, mutual fund 
managers specifically cater to and exploit this behavior by advertising end-return related 
improvements in reported performance. Third, mutual fund managers also align fee increases 
with periods of artificially heighted fund demand resulting from end-return related increases in 
performance, harming existing investors who pay higher fees for the same fund and potentially 
leaving new investors worse off.  
Specifically, examining the universe of actively managed, domestic mutual funds in the 
U.S., we first show that investors react to the stale information component in HPRs. In separate 
regressions, we relate measures of mutual fund capital allocations and redemptions in month t to 
fund return in month t-1 (new information) plus, in sequence, each of the other monthly return 
lags up to lag 73 (stale information). For example, the first regression includes the fund returns in 
t-1 and t-2 as independent variables, the second regression includes the fund returns in t-1 and t-3 
as independent variables, and so forth across 72 separate regressions. This approach allows us to 
decompose investor reaction to the change in HPR into new and end-return components. We 
then exploit differences in visibility of different return lags. Given that mutual funds are 
constrained to report HPRs over specific horizons, investor sensitivity to end-return effects 
should manifest only for lags specific to those horizons (specifically the 13th, 37th, and 61st return 
lag in our setting, relating to the 1, 3, and 5 year HPR). If investors are influenced by horizon 
effects, controlling for the new information conveyed by the return from period t-1, we expect 
those specific return lags to be associated with large and negative allocations to mutual funds, as 
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the removal of an observation from the HPR calculation has an inverse effect on the magnitude 
of the HPR.  
This is precisely what we find. On average, mutual fund investor allocations are more 
than twice as sensitive to return observations realized 13, 37, and 61 months prior than in other 
months and the coefficients on these return lags are all significantly negative. Although flow 
sensitivity to lagged performance is non-zero for many lags, only the coefficients for the 13th, 
37th, and 61st return lags are also consistently statistically different from the average sensitivity to 
lagged performance. Further, the magnitude of investor sensitivity to these return lags is of equal 
or greater magnitude to return-chasing on the first return lag. Investors appear unable to 
recognize the influence of time on HPR calculation horizons and direct disproportionate flows 
towards funds which benefit from the statute of limitations expiring on prior poor performance. 
We refer to this as stale return chasing.  
Stale return chasing behavior is consistent with incentives created by advertising. We 
show that mutual funds preferentially promote high HPRs and time advertising to periods when 
the 1, 3, and 5 year horizon HPRs are coincidentally high. This might not appear to be surprising 
since funds would be expected to selectively promote high returns. However, controlling for 
these incentives, we find that advertising spending is incrementally higher when the fund has 
benefited from end-return related improvements in HPRs. In other words, mutual funds appear to 
preferentially promote performance measures that arise from poor returns dropping off the end of 
the reported horizon. This is also not entirely surprising. It is easier to time advertising around 
predictable improvements in HPRs, resulting from negative end-returns dropping from the HPR 
horizon. These can be anticipated well in advanced and allow time for campaign development. 
Of course, future HPRs cannot be perfectly forecasted as they are equally influenced by the new 
return (which cannot be predicted) and the end-return which can be perfectly anticipated. 
However, as discussed in the introductory quote, in instances when the end-return is sufficiently 
large and negative, a relative improvement in HPRs can be easily foreseen. In additional results, 
we find that the horizon effect is more pronounced for funds with greater marketing expenditures 
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and the effect is most pronounced for fund-specific advertising that features HPR information or 
horizon specific rankings.  
 In the final part of the paper, relating the total expense ratio of the fund to our stale 
performance effect measures and controls, we find that mutual funds time fee increases by 
reducing waivers to coincide with periods of positive performance caused by negative end-
returns dropping from the HPR horizon. A one standard deviation increase in the stale 
performance signal is associated with a 20% increase in the fund’s expense ratio. The cost to 
newly attracted investors is hard to quantify as we are unable to observe the counterfactual 
choice – what investors would have purchased if they did not purchase this fund. Fee increases 
are incrementally higher when investor demand arises from stale performance signals. 
Unreported tests show that future fund performance is unrelated to stale performance chasing. 
However, existing investors are clearly harmed, paying higher fees for the same fund. In 
addition, this behavior distorts competition between mutual funds for investor allocations, 
rewarding managers who generate administrative costs running uninformative advertising. 
Our results contribute to the growing literature on how investors with limited attention 
react to information. Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2005) argue that investors are influenced by 
cosmetic effects. They show that mutual funds attract flows by changing their names to the 
current hot style with little underlying change in portfolio holdings. Barber, Odean, and Zheng 
(2005) argue that the purchase decisions of mutual fund investors are influenced by salient, 
attention-grabbing information. Investors buy funds that attract their attention through 
exceptional performance, marketing, or advertising. We show that investors also react to 
apparent increases in performance which occur as a function of horizon effects in the required 
reporting form.  
The most novel contribution of our paper, however, is the examination of opportunistic 
behavior by managers. There is limited evidence in the literature on the channels through which 
managers take advantage of behavioral biases. Li (2008) shows that annual report readability is 
related to earnings persistence as the annual reports of firms with lower earnings are harder to 
read. He argues that this is consistent with managerial incentives to obfuscate information when 
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firm performance is bad (also see Bloomfield, 2002). Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, and Shleifer 
(2008) develop an uninformative persuasion model where individuals think coarsely, grouping 
situations in categories and applying the same models of inference to all situations in the same 
category. They show that persuaders take advantage of coarse thinking by framing objectively 
useless information to influence individual’s choice of category. Bertrand, et al. (2010) argue 
that advertising content persuades by appealing peripherally to intuition rather than reason. Our 
research provides new evidence on how and when mutual funds use uninformative information 
(i.e. stale performance signals) to persuade investors that they are high-performance or quality 
funds.  
Palmiter and Taha (2012) argue that performance advertising by mutual funds is 
inherently and materially misleading, violates federal securities antifraud standards, and takes 
advantage of naïve investors. Provisions under the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act require further intervention by the SEC.4 To our knowledge, we are the 
first to document evidence consistent with funds planning advertising campaigns based on stale 
performance information and then strategically increasing fees to exploit return-chasing based on 
stale information. Our results are broadly consistent with mutual fund performance advertising 
misleading investors who do not appear to appreciate the influence of horizons on reported fund 
performance. 
Finally, our results may offer an economic mechanism to explain the horizon effects 
found in the asset pricing literature. It is well known in that literature that high stock returns in a 
month tend to forecast high stock returns 12-, 24-, and 36-months ahead (Jegadeesh, 1990, 
Heston and Sadka, 2008, 2010, Goyal and Wahal, 2013). While these papers do not explain why 
these effects appear to be most significant at annual return horizons, they may be related to 
investor reactions to reported performance at those horizons. 
                                                           
4 Specifically, the Act requires the Government Accountability Office to conduct a study on mutual fund advertising 
to identify (1) existing and proposed regulatory requirements for open-end investment company advertisements, (2) 
current marketing practices for the sale of open-end investment company shares, including the use of past 
performance data, (3) the impact of such advertising on consumers, and (4) recommendations to improve investor 
protections in mutual fund advertising and additional information necessary to ensure that investors can make 
informed financial decisions when purchasing shares. See the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 918, 124 Stat. 1376, 1837 (2010). 
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2. Literature Review and the General Setting 
Mutual funds are predominantly held by individual investors. In 2012, 44% of US 
households held mutual funds and 89% of US mutual fund assets were held by households. The 
median income of households which invest in mutual funds was $80,000 and 68% of those 
households held over 50% of financial assets in mutual funds.5 Thus, the typical mutual fund 
investor is an individual with limited time, whose professional training is likely focused on a 
non-financial field, and who potentially lacks the expertise to make investment selections.  
Due to the large number of funds available and the wealth of information provided by 
investment companies, analysts, and other investors via social networks, it is plausible that 
investors have only limited attention to devote to picking an appropriate mutual fund. Evaluating 
the merits of an actively managed mutual fund involves assessment of the asset picking and 
market timing ability of the manager as well as the inherent risk exposures of the fund’s assets. 
Individual investors must allocate attention to work and personal life, in addition to making 
investment decisions. Directing attention to a specific task requires effort and necessitates 
exclusion of other tasks (Fiske, 1995) and tends to be directed to information that is more vivid 
or salient (i.e. which is more prominent or which stands out).6 Further, the manner in which 
attention is allocated depends on the ease with which “relevant instances come to mind” 
(availability heuristic, Kahneman and Tversky, 1973).  
In our setting, HPRs feature extremely prominently in mutual fund advertising and 
analyst reports and are likely perceived as readily comprehensible by investors, thus being 
appealing both in terms of salience and availability. A sample mutual fund advertisement appears 
in panel A of Figure 1, providing a sense of the prominence of the HPR. Interpreting the returns 
disclosed in the advertisement, an investor may perceive that fund performance has steadily 
                                                           
5 See the 2013 Investment Company Institute Fact Book, 53rd Edition. 
6 For example, Amir (1993) reports that footnote disclosure of post-retirement benefits are underweighted by 
investors. See also the discussion by Fiske and Taylor (1991).  
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improved (reflected by the 1 year relative to the 3 year HPR). Beyond contrasting adjacent 
horizons, investors may also contrast changes in common horizons across timeframes (i.e. 
comparing the 1 year HPR in the current and previous quarters). However, as previously 
discussed, given the information in the advertisement, it is impossible for the investor to discern 
if the higher 1 year performance is due to a low end-return dropping from the 1 year horizon or 
strong recent performance. To disentangle the new and stale information components impounded 
in the reported HPRs, investors must access higher frequency return data. This requires a greater 
allocation of attention, assuming the investor is sophisticated enough to understand the need for 
such additional effort. 
There is evidence that even sophisticated investors, such as analysts, are influenced by 
the form and prominence of financial disclosures. For example, Hand (1990) reports abnormal 
reaction to re-announced gains from debt-equity swaps in quarterly earnings announcements and 
Plumlee (2003) finds that analyst’s revisions of forecasts of effective tax rates reflect less 
complex tax law changes but not more complicated information. Thus, even if investors 
understand the nuances of HPR reporting, framing or inattention may lead to misinterpretation of 
reported mutual fund performance.  
 
3. Measuring Investor Reaction to Stale Performance 
We obtain mutual fund data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
Mutual Fund Database. Our sample commences in 1992, when CRSP consistently begins 
reporting monthly frequency total net asset (TNA) values and concludes in December 2010. The 
CRSP database provides monthly TNA and returns by fund share class as well as quarterly or 
annual disclosures of management and 12b-1 fees, front and back end loads, portfolio turnover, 
and fund management objectives. We aggregate multiple share classes of the same fund, 
weighting returns, fees, loads and portfolio turnover by share class TNA, and focus our analysis 
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on actively managed, domestic equity funds.7 The early part of the time series of our dataset 
(1992-1998) includes on average 1,774 funds, provided by 470 separate investment companies 
(fund families) with a combined TNA of 1.0 trillion USD. Our dataset expands to include on 
average 3,093 funds, 534 families, and a combined TNA of 3.7 trillion USD in the later part of 
the data time series (2005-2010). 
To measure the stale performance effect, we relate proxies for investor allocation 
preferences to the first return lag plus successive return lags (n=2 to 73), in 72 separate 
regressions: 
∆ = 	
 +  +  +              (1) 
where n signifies the lag of the second return included as an independent variable in month t. The 
primary measure of investor preferences is the change in market share held by the fund, defined 
as: 
∆, =
,

−
,

      (2) 
where , is total net assets under management for fund i in month t, and  is aggregate total 
net assets for all funds in the sample at time t. We use the change in market share as our primary 
investor preference proxy as Spiegel and Zhang (2013) argue that the more commonly utilized 
proxy, net flow, fails to consider the effect of aggregate investor allocations when testing the 
flow-performance relation. Chalmers, Kaul, and Phillips (2013) show that investors react to 
macroeconomic indicators in unison when allocating flows across mutual fund asset classes. 
Flow-performance models which fail to control for correlated flows across funds of the same 
type may be misspecified. To further control for correlated investor allocations across time or 
fund, when estimating equation (1) we cluster standard errors by fund and date (month-year). 
A disadvantage with market share measures is that a fund market share might increase if 
it holds securities that increase in value even if they do not attract or lose any new investors due 
to stale return roll off. For example, if a fund holds 30% of its allocation in IBM and IBM triples 
in a month, this fund’s market share is likely to increase, even absent any new flows. Hence, in 
                                                           
7 To identify actively managed mutual funds, we use the list of actively managed funds from Cremers and Petajisto 
(2009) available from Antti Petajisto’s website http://www.petajisto.net/data.html. 
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Panel B, we also report the same regression as in equation (1) but using net flow as our 
dependent measure.  
 = 	
 +  +  +      (3) 
Net flow is defined as: , =
	
,	
,×,
	
,
 where flow for fund i in month t 
is calculated as the percentage change in TNA while controlling for return (R) effects. The 
intuition behind this measure can be illustrated with a simple example. Suppose a fund has a 
TNA value of $500 in period t and its rate of return is 5% over the coming month. In the absence 
of any changes in investor behavior, the fund TNA will be $550.  Hence, a TNA value of $580 in 
period t+1 implies that net inflows were $30.  These net inflows should be subject to stale return 
chasing, not the increase in TNA, $50, due to the return earned by the fund. For robustness, we 
also replicate our analysis using net sales (sales less redemptions excluding dividend 
reinvestment) collected directly from fund N-SAR filings and provided by Morningstar. 
We note that using the traditional Fama-MacBeth (FM) type regression specification is 
inappropriate in our analysis. The FM approach assumes serial non-correlation and strong cross-
sectional correlations. This is plausible when the dependent variable is a return but not when it is 
an inflow or on outflow. 
As previously discussed, to motivate our use of equation (1) and (3), we note that the 
change in HPR has only two influences, the magnitude of the return in the current period and the 
magnitude of the end-return which drops from the calculation. These two returns have an 
equivalent impact on the HPR, though only the former is new information. Modeling investor 
response to the change in HPR, it then follows that ∆mt (or Flowt) becomes a function of the new 
and end-return, linearly approximated by equation (1). All intervening returns are common 
between adjacent HPRs and have no influence on ∆HPR. If investors interpret the stale 
information component of the change in HPR as information regarding future fund performance, 
we expect the βn coefficient related to return observations at the end of standard HPR reporting 
periods to be negative. This relation follows from the inverse relation between the magnitude of 
the end return which drops from the sample and the change in the HPR.  
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4. Do investors chase stale returns? 
The βn coefficients from the pooled, OLS regression series in equation (1) and associated 
t-statistics are reported in Panel A of Table I. As discussed, mutual funds are required to report 
HPRs in set intervals of 1, 5, and 10 years and reporting the 3 year HPR has become convention. 
Given the length of our sample, we focus on the first three intervals. Thus, the variables of 
interest in Table I are the magnitudes and signs of the 13th, 37th, and 61st monthly return lag. The 
first reported t-statistic (Reg. t-stat) tests if the coefficient is significantly different from zero. We 
note that there are several coefficients, apart from the coefficients of interest, that are also 
statistically significant (examples include β4, β6, or β7). It is plausible that the random allocation 
activity of investors causes the coefficients for certain return lags to be different from zero. 
Hence, we implement a standard placebo test, randomly allocating returns to investor allocation 
observations with and without replacement and replicate equation (1). In the placebo tests 
(reported in Table A1 of the online appendix), a similar number of return coefficients are 
statistically different from zero, reflecting an inherent level of noise in investor preferences and 
the estimation of their relation with returns. In addition, although we have no specific priors that 
investors should use other return lags when directing allocations, we do not exclude the 
possibility that future research will uncover further relations between return lags and investor 
allocations. The significance of other return coefficients may also reflect these unknown 
relations. Hence, we also report a difference t-statistic (Diff. t-stat) below the regular t-statistic 
testing if the return coefficient is different from the absolute mean coefficient, which is the value 
arising from random allocations by investors. Since the average absolute return coefficient value 
in Panel A of Table I is 0.145, the difference t-statistic tests the null hypothesis Ho: Rn = 
average|Rn| = 0.145.  
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We find that the coefficients related to the 13th, 37th, and 61st return lags are larger than 
all but one of the other coefficients.8 The average absolute value of these three coefficients is 
0.35, twice the size of the absolute mean coefficient (significant at the 5% level). With the 
exception of the Rt-14 and Rt-18 coefficients, none of the other coefficients are significantly 
different from both zero and the absolute mean of the coefficient sample (α=10%).9 In particular, 
the 25th, 49th, and 73rd return lag coefficients, which relate to the 2, 4, and 6 year HPRs, are not 
significantly different from the absolute mean (t-statistics 1.51, 0.41 and 1.15, respectively). It is 
also noteworthy that the magnitudes of return-chasing on the lags of interest are of equal or 
greater magnitude to return-chasing on the first return lag (the average coefficient value on the 
first return lag in equation (1) is 0.31). Investor asset allocations appear equally or more sensitive 
to the stale information reflected in HPR end-returns relative to the new information reflected in 
the most recent return. Our conclusions are qualitatively similar when we use equation (3) using 
net flow, as an alternative proxy for investor preferences. The coefficients are reported in Panel 
B. We note that in particular, the Rt-14 and Rt-18 coefficients are no longer significantly different 
from the absolute mean. To provide a sense of economic scale, a one standard deviation shift in 
Rt-1, Rt-13, Rt-37, or Rt-61 is associated with a 2.0%, 1.7%, 2.2% and 2.7% shift in flow (net sales or 
redemptions as a percentage of fund TNA). 
It is also noteworthy that some coefficients are consistently negative (though not always 
significantly different from the absolute mean of the sample). These are typically months right 
around annual horizons and at semi-annual horizons. For example, Rt-6, Rt-12, Rt-14, Rt-18, Rt-24,   
and Rt-25 coefficients are all usually significantly negative.  Our results pertain to investor 
responses to stale returns, not managerial responses. It is likely that there are other significant 
patterns in past returns that affect investor behavior that we have not isolated. Whether these 
patterns in investor responses to past returns are related to asset pricing anomalies documented in 
the literature, is likely to form an interesting extension to this paper. 
                                                           
8
 The Rt-14 is larger than the Rt-61 coefficient (-0.29 versus -0.28) but is smaller than the Rt-13 and Rt-37 (-0.33 
and -0.43, respectively). 
9
 Using an alpha value of 5%, only the 13th and 37th return lags are different from the absolute mean coefficient. 
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We next implement a series of robustness tests and extensions to the base model, which 
are reported in Panels C and D in Table 1 and in Table A2 of the Online Appendix. As 
previously discussed, only the most recent return and the end-return which drops from the 
sample influence the change in HPR and our focus is to determine if investors differentiate 
between these two sources of changes in HPRs. For this reason, we exclude intervening returns 
from the stale return-chasing model in Panel A. The alternative hypothesis to stale performance 
chasing is that investors observe the full time series of returns and make asset allocation 
decisions after considering all available returns. Under this alternative hypothesis, stale 
performance chasing should not be observed as the investor can easily decompose the change in 
HPR into current and stale information components. In Panel C, we replicate Panel A, but 
estimate the coefficient on each return lag simultaneously in one pooled regression, in essence 
assuming that investors observe and adjust allocations jointly based on all 73 return lags 
(equation (4)).  
∆ = 	
 +∑ 

 +                     (4) 
Our conclusions are unaffected. The coefficient estimates are similar between Panel A and C. 
The average value of the β13, β37, and β61 coefficients is -0.34 relative to -0.35 in Panel A. The Rt-
14 coefficient is no longer statistically different from the average absolute coefficient in the joint 
model though Rt-6 and Rt-7 become statistically different. We also report a more parsimonious 
version of equation (4) in Panel D where we also include Rt as an additional coefficient, and 
obtain largely similar results. 
The remainder of the extensions and robustness tests are reported in Panel E and in Table 
A2 of the online appendix. In the interest of brevity, only the coefficients of interest are reported 
in Panel E (the full output is reported in Table A2). For ease of comparison, coefficients from 
Panel A are reported in Panel E as model (1). Across all our tests, the β13, β37, and β61 coefficients 
are the only coefficients that are consistently significantly different both from zero and the 
average.  
In model (2) we jointly cluster by fund, fund family and time as investor allocations may 
be correlated at the family level. Clustering on the additional family dimension does not alter our 
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conclusions. All three coefficients remain significant at the 1% level. However, investor 
allocations are likely to be influenced by a range of factors beyond prior fund performance. In 
the base specification earlier, controls for investor preferences were not included. This is because 
if the determinants of stale return chasing are also the determinants of investor preferences, this 
joint influence will cause our stale performance chasing estimates to be understated.10  
Cognisant of this potential conflict, in model (3), we replicate equation (1) adding the 
following controls commonly used in the mutual fund literature (all measured at the end of 
period t-1): change in market share, fund TNA, fund age, family TNA, number of funds in the 
fund family, standard deviation of monthly fund returns over the prior year, expense ratio, 
portfolio turnover, Morningstar rating, and the change in Morningstar rating. Expense ratio and 
portfolio turnover are calculated as the percentage of TNA charged as expenses and the 
percentage of TNA traded per annum, respectively. Overall, our conclusions are unaffected. As 
expected however, the addition of controls diminishes the size of the stale return chasing 
coefficients. In particular, the magnitude of the Rt-61 coefficient decreases from -0.28 to -0.23 and 
the coefficient is no longer statistically different from the absolute coefficient mean. The Rt-13 
and Rt-37 retain both their significance and remain statistically different from the absolute mean, 
the only coefficients to do so. The majority of the shift in the magnitude of the Rt-61 coefficient 
appears to be caused by including fund expenses and portfolio turnover. Unreported tests show 
these variables also determine the magnitude of the stale return chasing coefficient from Panel A, 
causing the stale performance chasing effect to be understated in model (3). 
Next, we seek to differentiate between stale performance chasing at the fund and 
objective level. To do so, we estimate equation (1) with the addition of fund objective fixed 
effects (model 4). In this model specification, though two of the three coefficients of interest 
diminish in size, all three coefficients remain statistically different from the absolute mean 
(α=10%). This result suggests that majority of stale performance effect occurs based on fund 
level and not objective level returns. Jointly augmenting equation (1) to include both objective 
                                                           
10
 For example, investors that prefer larger funds may also be more prone to react to stale return signals. Hence 
including fund size as a control will cause stale performance chasing to be understated. 
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fixed effects and controls generates coefficients of interest largely on par with the estimates in 
Panel A (model 5).  
It can be argued that seasonal activities undertaken by funds, such as window dressing or 
dividend payments will bias our estimates. For example, funds predominantly pay dividends in 
December and the majority of investors instruct the fund to automatically reinvest dividends.11 
Since CRSP adjusts returns to include dividends, returns are bolstered in December for dividend 
paying funds and NAV will increase by the reinvested dividend amount. It is important to 
recognize that our model inherently controls for seasonal effects, as returns are not necessarily 
calendar aligned as the return series for each fund starts at inception which may occur at any 
time. Thus, for example, Rt-13 is not inherently a December return for all funds.  
To mitigate concerns related to seasonal effects, we use three approaches. First, we 
replicate our models after clustering by month. Since our results remain robust to this approach, 
we do not report these results for brevity. Second, we utilize total sales and redemptions from the 
N-SAR filings of each fund available from Morningstar. This alternative data source enables the 
direct calculation of investor preferences (sales – redemptions) from which we exclude re-
invested dividends. Using net sales (model 6), the significance of the coefficients of interest 
improves. Third, we exclude January returns from the sample and replicate the model (Model 7, 
Table 2A of the Online Appendix) and find similar results. 
Finally, we report several specifications in Table A2 in the Online Appendix to answer 
additional questions. We emphasize that these are largely ad hoc specifications which are not 
driven by theory. First, do investors react to raw returns or market-adjusted returns? To answer 
this question, in Model 8, we estimate the model using returns in excess of the return to the 
SP500 Index. Our results are largely unaffected by this adjustment with this model generating 
results broadly consistent with model 4 of Panel E in the main paper. Second, is the relation 
symmetric? In other words, are the results driven only by negative returns dropping from the 
                                                           
11 In the 2011 Factbook, the Investment Company Institute reported that investors reinvested $173 out of $202 
billion USD paid in dividends (86%). Examining the payment period in the CRSP database, 20% of dividends are 
paid in December, with remaining dividends spread evenly over the remaining months with the exception of small 
increases in frequency at the end of calendar quarters. 
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sample? Coefficient estimates reported in Table A2 Model 9 are estimated after replacing each 
negative return with 0, thus eliminating negative returns from the return history. We find 
significant effects when positive returns are dropped from the sample, implying that the 
relationship is symmetric. In particular, the Rt-13, Rt-37, and Rt-61 retain their significance though 
not surprisingly, given the ad hoc nature of this analysis, a few other variables such as Rt-45 also 
become significant. Finally, in Table A2 Model 10, we examine if the effect is non-linear in 
general. We sort each coefficient of interest Rt-13, Rt-37, and Rt-61 into terciles and report the β 
coefficients for the three regressions separately. The magnitude of the stale return chasing effect 
does appear to increase strikingly when the most negative returns drop off from the sample. 
However, we still find a significant return-chasing relation even when the highest returns drop 
off from the sample, consistent with the results reported in Model 9. 
 We note that our results are sensitive to the choice of sub-period. As we discuss below, 
the prominence to investors of HPR changes is influenced by time varying manager behavior. 
More importantly, large improvements in HPRs result from large negative returns dropping from 
the horizon of analysis. HPR changes are hence realized in cascades, with a large negative return 
dropping from the 1 year horizon first, impacting the 3-year HPR 2 years later and finally 
affecting the 5-year HPR after an additional two years have passed. For example, consider the 
period immediately after the dotcom bubble (referred to in the introductory quote). Funds that 
were exposed to the end of bubble decline in 2002 will not realize 5-year effects in their returns 
till 2007. Thus, the average effects we report in Table 1 are not realized in all sub-periods but are 
observed to vary across the time series as a cascade or wave. This may also give the impression 
of steadily improving performance (see Figure 1 Panel A) and encourage investors to invest. 
In sum, these results provide strong evidence of mutual fund investors chasing stale 
performance. Mutual fund allocations are more sensitive to lagged returns associated with the 
end of commonly reported HPR periods. These findings are consistent with mutual fund 
investors observing changes in HPR values and interpreting these changes as new information 
regarding future fund performance.  
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5. Does fund advertising take advantage of stale return chasing behavior? 
We use two proxies for fund marketing expenditures. First, following Sirri and Tufano 
(1998), we use the 12b-1 expenditure of the fund. The 12b-1 fee is a noisy proxy. Although 
described as being levied to cover marketing and distribution expenses, only approximately 2% 
is used for promotion or advertising.12 Although a relatively small proportion of the 12b-1 fee is 
directed at advertising, it is still used in prior research as a reasonable proxy for the general 
marketing effort of the fund. 
Our second proxy for marketing expenditure is investment company advertising data 
compiled by Kantar Media (KM). KM is an advertising consulting firm which makes available 
compendiums of advertising activity in all U.S. media outlets. Although KM collects data for all 
advertising mediums, our data is limited to print media (newspaper and magazine) advertising, 
which Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) report accounts for 65% of total investment company 
advertising expenditures. The KM dataset includes estimates of advertising expenditures based 
on advertisement size, placement, and periodical. This data is summarized monthly by 
investment company and periodical from 2005 to 2010. In addition, for the magazine 
advertisements, a PDF copy of each advertisement is supplied. A detailed description of the 
advertising dataset construction process appears in the online appendix. In total, 123 magazines 
and 3 newspapers appear in the dataset. Examples include common finance periodicals such as 
the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, Barron, and Bloomberg Business Week in addition 
to magazines with other focuses such as Bon Appetit, Coastal Living, or Rolling Stone. 144 
unique fund families advertise at least once in the dataset. The magazine portion of the dataset 
features 2,355 unique advertisements, many featured in multiple magazines over multiple 
months. 
Table II presents summary statistics for the advertising dataset. On average, investment 
companies spent 264 million USD on print media advertising annually. Spending typically 
increases annually, on average by 16% year-over-year, with the exception of 2008 to 2009 when 
                                                           
12
 The balance is used for advisor initial sales incentives (40%), ongoing shareholder services (52%) and 
underwriting fees (6%) (ICI, 2005). 
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advertising expenditures dropped by 31%, coinciding with the start of the mortgage backed 
security (MBS) crisis. On average, 66% of advertising expenditures were directed at magazines 
relative to newspapers. These values are broadly consistent with Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) 
who note that, on average, from 1996 to 2002 investment companies spent 199 million USD per 
year on print media advertising, with a 60:40 proportion between magazines and newspapers. 
To provide a sense of the objective of investment company advertising, we partition the 
magazine advertisements by focus. Investment companies provide a range of products and 
services in addition to mutual funds, such as exchange traded funds, retirement plans, or other 
types of investment plans. On average, only 32% of advertising undertaken by investment 
companies directly promotes mutual funds. Of the advertising focused on promoting mutual 
funds, on average, 31% focused on general promotion of the fund family, while the other 69% 
promoted one or more specific funds. 39% of fund specific advertising promoted the HPR of the 
featured funds. Rankings by mutual fund rating agencies such as Morningstar, Lipper, or Barron 
are commonly computed using HPRs over the standardized 1, 3, 5, and 10 year horizons and it is 
common to provide separate ratings for the same fund based on each horizon. Thus, we 
separately track advertisements that promote a rating by an analyst that is horizon-specific (8% 
of fund specific advertising). Of the remaining 53% of fund specific advertising, 38% promote 
the overall rank of the fund by an analyst without reference to the HPR and 15% promoted other 
fund features such as fee structure or the fund manager.  
The trend of increased spending on advertising from year-to-year is evident in each of 
these partitions with the noteworthy exception of spending on advertisements that feature HPRs. 
In 2005, 57% of fund specific advertising promoted HPRs and this proportion declines 
throughout the sample, dropping sharply from 2007 to 2009, coinciding with negative market 
performance associated with the MBS crisis. In 2009, investment companies spent 18 times less 
money promoting HPR results than in 2005 (28.5 million in 2005 relative to 1.6 million USD in 
2009). This trend is consistent with investment companies preferentially advertising HPR 
information only when performance is strong.  
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To more closely examine the determinants of advertising and the influence of HPRs on 
advertising expenditures, in Table III, we relate the change in annual fund specific advertising 
expenditures to determinant variables. Ideally, we would run a cross-sectional regression using 
advertising expenses as our dependent variable and monthly returns as our independent 
variables. If investment companies were indeed taking advantage of stale return chasing 
behavior, we would expect that the worse the t-13, t-37, and t-61 returns, the higher advertising 
expenses would be in period t (companies increase advertising spending when they look better). 
Unfortunately, advertising data is coarse. Spending by investment companies can go from zero in 
one month to a large positive number in the next.  In addition, advertising is seasonal and the 
same advertisement is run in multiple magazines over different or the same months. Though the 
data is reported monthly, the irregularity of the data leads us to implement the same idea on an 
annual basis. Hence, we compute annual advertising expenses starting from the start date of each 
fund. If investment firms were taking advantage of stale return chasing behavior, we would 
expect that the larger the drop off in the T-4 and T-7 annual returns, the higher the advertising 
expenses should be in year T. 
Specifically, we first partition the dependent variable by expenditures that feature HPR 
information (either actual returns or HPR related rank) and advertising that features analysis 
recommendation absent of HPR info. Collectively, these two types of advertising represent 85% 
of fund level advertising expenditures in our sample. The dependent variables are standardized 
by fund TNA as advertising expenditures are inherently greater for larger funds (Gallaher, 
Kaniel, and Starks, 2008). Standard errors are clustered by fund and the models include year 
fixed effects.13  
We limit our sample to funds which advertise any time between 2005 and 2010. As 
shown in Table II, many fund families elect not to advertise HPRs, or for that matter, elect not to 
advertise at all. We focus on funds which advertise HPRs or analyst rank as our objective is to 
model the timing decisions and incentives to utilize HPRs as a promotional tool and not the 
                                                           
13 Our results are robust to joint clustering of standard errors by fund and fund family. 
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underlying decision of whether to advertise or not. For controls, we follow Gallaher, Kaniel, and 
Starks (2008) who find that performance over the prior year, family size, loads, fees, portfolio 
turnover, Morningstar rating, flow, and flow volatility influence annual family-level advertising 
expenditures. To this list, we add market return as Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) find that 
funds are more prone to advertise performance results during periods of strong market 
performance, regardless of the relative performance of the fund. We also include fund age, as 
young funds may be more likely to advertise to increase investor awareness.  
We focus first on advertising that reports HPR related information, either the actual return 
or analyst rating by holding period (Panel A). In models (1) - (3) of Table III, we find that funds 
spend more money advertising HPRs the year after the 1, 3, and 5 year HPRs are individually 
higher (average t-statistic 3.54), consistent with funds seeking to draw attention to prior strong 
performance.14 In economic terms, an increase of one standard deviation of 1, 3, and 5 year 
HPRs individually increases advertising spending by $421,006, $526,257, and $799,911 
respectively. The significance of each HPR coefficient is retained when the three HPRs are 
considered jointly (models (4)). Collectively, an increase of one standard deviation in all three 
HPRs increases advertising spending by $1,473,520. These values are relative to average annual 
spending on HPR advertising of approximately 15 million dollars. Thus, a joint one standard 
deviation shift in all three coefficients results in a 10% shift in advertising expenditures. 
We next seek to differentiate between advertising current relative to stale performance. 
Specifically, we seek to understand the source of the relative size of the HPR advertised by 
mutual funds, i.e. is the HPR high due to positive recent performance or due to the passage of 
time and weak prior performance dropping from the sample? To make this distinction, we 
partition the sample into quartiles by the 1 year HPR which dropped from the sample (i.e. the 

	
or 
	
 for the 3 and 5 year HPR, respectively). The two middle quartiles are 
aggregated to form three partitions. If funds are preferentially advertising stale performance, we 
                                                           
14 To ensure clarity in our notation, 
	
  refers to the 3 year HPR calculated using monthly returns and ending 
in year t-1. 
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expect greater spending on HPR advertising when the return which dropped from the sample is 
small (more negative), resulting in an increase in the reported HPR.  
We find that funds indeed spend a greater amount on HPR related advertising when 
reported HPRs are higher due a low return dropping from the horizon of assessment. 
Specifically, the average coefficient on the 1, 3 and 5 year HPR is 0.29 in the bottom quartile of 
the 
	
  relative to an average value of 0.07 in the top quartile (a fourfold difference). The 
magnitude of the difference is similar for the 
	
  partition models. Since funds are required 
to jointly advertise the 1, 5, and 10 year HPRs and, by convention, also typically report the 3 
year HPR, the coefficient sizes across the 1, 3, and 5 HPR variables are similar. This result 
suggests that funds make HPR related advertising decisions jointly evaluating the four reported 
HPRs. They also suggest a strong preference to advertise stale performance effects on HPRs by 
mutual funds.  
These results are not entirely unexpected. Improvements in HPRs due to poor 
performance dropping from the horizon of assessment are likely easier to predict than 
improvements due to immediate past performance. Hence, funds are better able to systematically 
plan advertising campaigns around stale performance related improvements in HPRs than recent 
performance improvements. In Panel B of Table III, we replicate the tests using fund advertising 
that includes analyst rating information excluding HPR references as the dependent variable. Our 
results are highly similar, suggesting that funds interchangeably use analyst and HPR related 
advertising to draw attention to the fund when the fund has benefited from an increase in 
performance. We hypothesize that the underlying decision to utilize HPR advertising relates to 
investor sensitivity to HPRs and explore this thesis in greater detail below.  
Turning briefly to the control variables, funds from larger fund families tend to spend 
more on HPR advertising. Younger funds typically spend smaller amounts advertising HPRs, 
perhaps due to the limited performance history available for younger funds. Fund families 
typically promote funds with lower flows and higher flow standard deviations, higher expense 
ratios and front end loads, and funds with higher Morningstar ratings which realize an increase in 
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Morningstar rating. Back end loads and portfolio turnover are not significant determinants of 
HPR advertising expenditures. 
 
6. What does stale performance chasing depend on? 
6.1. Cross-sectional determinants 
To explore the determinants of stale performance chasing at the fund-level, we estimate 
equation (1) by fund and year, producing an annual time series of  coefficients for each fund. 
We then relate the fund-level β13, β37, and β61 coefficient time series to determinant variables 
using a pooled, cross-sectional panel to test a series of hypotheses. As in prior models, we 
include time fixed effects and cluster standard errors by fund. As the dependent variable is an 
estimated quantity from equation (1), to correct for heteroskedasticity induced by variance in the 
observations of the dependent variable, we follow Lewis and Linzer (2005) and calculate t-
statistics utilizing White (1980) heteroskedastic consistent standard errors.  
Our fund visibility hypotheses assume an environment of heterogeneously informed 
investors who must choose among a large number of fund alternatives.15 As argued in Sirri and 
Tufano (1998), search costs are high, both due to the number of alternatives which need to be 
evaluated and the large amount of information provided by a variety of outlets. We distinguish 
between mutual fund supplied information (advertising) and external fund visibility (where the 
fund is visible for reasons other than fund supplied advertising). This division is motivated by 
Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007) who document differential performance chasing by investors of 
funds with greater “passively available” information such as funds from large families which 
greater information distribution services.16 Large funds are more likely to be covered in the 
popular press, implying that fund supplied advertising is likely to be less important for these 
funds. We argue that less sophisticated investors, who are unable to differentiate between funds 
                                                           
15 In this context, the information set available to each investor is largely homogeneous. Heterogeneity arises from 
variation in investor ability to effectively synthesize and analyze information as a result of sophistication and time 
constraints. 
16 Huang, Wei and Yan (2007) differentiate between passively available information available via the media or 
brokers which arrives with minimal effort by the investor relative to actively available information for which the 
investor must exert effort and seek out. 
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based on more relevant factors, will select funds which reduce search costs via visibility. This 
effect is likely to be lower for funds with high external visibility. These expectations are broadly 
consistent with relations noted by Kaniel, Starks, and Vasudevan (2008) who find that the effects 
of media coverage on fund flow is greater for younger funds which they argue have lower 
inherent external visibility. 
Hypothesis 1: Mutual funds which advertise more broadly, and especially 
mutual funds that advertise HPR information, are more likely to attract investors 
prone to react to artificial performance trends in HPRs. The effect is likely to be 
lower for mutual funds which are more visible due to their size or the size of 
their fund family or for funds for which a longer return history is available. 
 
The regression analysis in this portion of the paper is limited to the 2005-2010 period due 
to the limitations of advertising data availability. Our proxies for external fund visibility include 
fund size (TNA), age, the number of funds in the mutual fund family, and uncertainty in fund 
value (proxied by mutual fund return standard deviation). Our proxies for fund supplied visibility 
include the marketing and advertising expenses for the fund (described in the previous section).  
We partition mutual fund advertising into three segments at the family level: 1) non-
mutual fund advertising, 2) mutual fund advertising that is not fund specific and 3) mutual fund 
advertising that is fund specific. Fund specific advertising is then divided into advertising the 
fund of interest or a different fund. Advertising that features the fund of interest is finally divided 
into 1) ads which include HPR info (either actual return or analyst ratings by HPR horizon), 2) 
ads that include analyst rating but no HPR info and 3) ads that do not include either HPR or 
analyst ratings. 
Recall that a more negative βn reflects more pronounced stale performance chasing. In 
Table IV, we document results that are broadly consistent across the three return-chasing 
coefficients. Stale performance chasing tends to be lower for larger (greater TNA) and older 
funds and funds from larger families (greater family TNA). Funds from families which offer a 
larger number of funds also tend to have less return-chasing, though the relation is not significant 
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at conventional levels. Stale performance chasing tends to be higher for funds with greater value 
uncertainty as proxied by the standard deviation of mutual fund returns over the prior year. These 
results are consistent with Hypothesis 1: funds that are externally visible to investors are less 
prone to stale performance chasing as information search costs for these funds are lower and 
more relevant decision factors can more easily be obtained.  
 We next examine the effect of fund marketing on stale performance chasing. Funds with 
higher 12b-1 expenditures typically realize more pronounced stale return-chasing. The relation is 
significant when considered jointly with the advertising expenditure proxies, suggesting that 
12b-1 fees capture a unique aspect of the fund marketing effort which renders the fund more 
visible. One potential channel is via broker sales as 12b-1 fees are commonly utilized to create 
inducements for brokers to sell funds.  
Advertising broadly increases stale performance chasing, both at the fund and family-
level. First, focusing on family-level partitions, non-mutual fund related advertising has little 
effect on the magnitude of false return chasing, an unsurprising result. However, general mutual 
fund advertising at the family level induces a stronger investor response to stale performance 
trends (negative and significant Family Mutual Fund Ad Spending coefficient). Turning to fund 
specific advertising, ads which report HPR info induce the largest investor response to stale 
performance signals, followed by advertising that features analyst ratings. The magnitude of the 
response of investors to ads that feature HPR info is typically twice that of ads that feature 
analyst rating with no reference to HPR info. The sensitivity of stale performance chasing to ads 
featuring analyst rating likely arises from the timing of such advertising, which we show in Table 
III to coincide with end-return related improvements in HPRs. Fund specific advertisements that 
promote another fund or mention neither HPRs or analyst rating have no significant effect on 
stale performance chasing, which is perhaps surprising given the otherwise broad evidence that 
non-fund specific advertising typically generates greater stale performance chasing. This result 
is, however, consistent with investors typically reacting more strongly to HPR advertisements. 
The strongest inducement for investors to chase stale performance is typically fund specific 
advertising that mentions horizon specific information.  
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We also consider an alternative form of fund promotion not undertaken by the fund, but 
provided by Morningstar via its star ratings. Morningstar ratings are based on performance over 
the prior 3, 5, and 10 years, adjusted for risk based on variation in the fund’s monthly 
performance, placing emphasis on downward variations.17 As Morningstar ratings are 
determined largely based on HPRs, improvements in star ratings are likely to coincide with 
periods when stale performance effects are realized. At that time, the ranking method emphasizes 
return persistence resulting from the reduction of negative (or lower relative) monthly returns 
over each horizon. Thus, the Morningstar rating system draws attention to HPR over the same 
horizons commonly advertised by mutual funds and may be an alternative determinant of stale 
performance chasing. Prior analysis has shown that investors respond to Morningstar ratings, 
apparently perceiving them to be an indicator of manager skill. For example, Del Guercio and 
Tkac (2008) document that changes in Morningstar ratings generate abnormal flow following 
both upgrades (positive flow) and downgrades (negative flow).18 We find that funds more highly 
ranked by Morningstar or that have realized an improvement in Morningstar rating are associated 
with greater stale performance chasing and the effect is of similar magnitude to advertising 
undertaken by the fund itself. 
As a final test of the cross-sectional determinants of stale return chasing, we examine the 
extent to which the phenomenon varies by investor sophistication. Sophisticated investors should 
understand the mechanical influence of time on HPRs and recognize that HPR signals provide no 
new information in excess of the most recent return observation. As a proxy for investor 
sophistication, we contrast retail with institutional funds (as reported in the CRSP database). 
Institutional funds are marketed to high net worth individuals and large pension funds managed 
by professionals who are often viewed as being more sophisticated than retail investors. Across 
all three stale return horizons we find that, if anything, institutional investors are more prone to 
stale return chasing than retail investors. The coefficient on the institutional fund indicator is 
                                                           
17 See “The Morningstar Rating for Funds” 2008 factsheet. 
18 See also Kraussl and Sandelowsky (2007) who examine the predictive performance of Morningstar ratings over a 
ten-year period and conclude they have limited predictive ability of future performance and the predictive ability of 
the ratings worsens after changes to the rating methodology in 2002. Blake and Morey (2000) find similar results. 
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negative in all three models and is significantly lower in model (2). Our results on stale 
performance chasing are similar to those of Alti, Kaniel, and Yoeli (2006) who document return-
chasing in an institutional subset of funds. In addition, Salganik (2012) finds no distinction in 
fund selection ability between retail and institutional investors. 
 We next undertake a series of unreported robustness checks. First, we replicate our 
analysis augmenting the model with objective fixed effects and additionally clustering standard 
errors by fund family. As in Table I, addition of objective fixed effects does not notably alter the 
size of the coefficient estimates, suggesting that stale return chasing occurs primarily in response 
to fund and not objective level returns.  
Second, to control for endogenous fund characteristics to which investors are 
alternatively reacting, we use two alternative model specifications. We replicate the analysis 
adding the other two return-chasing coefficients not considered, as independent variables. For 
example in the β13 regressions, we add β37 and β61 as independent variables. We hypothesize that 
if investors are reacting to endogenous factors, these factors are likely to be consistent across the 
3 return-chasing coefficients and will thus be reflected in commonalities in those coefficients.19 
In addition, we replicate the analysis excluding funds which undergo a manager change, as the 
timing of this change may coincide with improvements in HPR. Our results are robust to both 
alternative model specifications. 
Finally, we replicate the tests using β25 and β49 as dependent variables. Advertising 
expenditures should have little explanatory power for return-chasing coinciding with non-
standard reporting horizons. Consistent with this expectation, we find an insignificant relation 
between the β25 and β49 coefficients and advertising expenditures with one exception. Advertising 
which promotes a specific fund and reports HPR results is significantly related to stale 
performance chasing in these two non-standard horizons. However, the magnitude of these 
coefficients is typically one third the size of the coefficients for the standard horizons (β13, β37, 
                                                           
19 The average correlation between the return-chasing coefficient pairs is 0.26, suggesting that each coefficient 
reflects unique stale performance chasing episodes and do not reflect endogenous fund characteristics to which 
investors are reacting. 
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and β61), consistent with spillover effects. For example, investors may be enticed to invest in the 
fund in a prior period when standard HPR results are advertised and increase their positions 
following positive returns in subsequent periods.  
To summarize our results, flow sensitivity to stale performance effects appears to be 
largely driven by the magnitude of marketing effort either at the fund or the family-level. Funds 
that advertise more broadly, and particularly funds that advertise favorable horizon specific 
results, realize significantly greater inflows following favorable stale performance chasing 
signals. Stale performance chasing is similarly greater if the HPRs of the fund are indirectly 
promoted via the Morningstar rating system or broker sales (proxied by 12b-1 fees). Funds with 
higher star ratings are more prone to stale performance chasing behavior by investors. These 
effects are attenuated if the fund is already externally visible to investors due to its size, age, or 
the size of the fund family. Stale return chasing is consistent across investor sophistication 
profiles, providing support for the effect arising due to investor inattention as opposed to naivety 
reasons. 
 
6.2. Time series determinants 
We next turn to time series trends in stale performance chasing to examine how market 
conditions affect the propensity of investors to react to stale performance. If stale performance 
chasing is undertaken by unsophisticated investors faced with high search costs, then periods of 
heightened uncertainty in financial markets should relate to higher flow sensitivity to stale 
performance chasing signals. We base this hypothesis on the findings of Sirri and Tufano (1998) 
and others who show that less sophisticated investors make allocation decisions based on raw, as 
opposed to market or risk adjusted returns. Thus, during market downturns and periods of 
uncertainty, search costs increase as identification of a positive performing fund on a raw basis 
becomes more difficult. 
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Hypothesis 2a: During periods of heightened investor uncertainty in financial 
markets, search costs increase and investors become more likely to react to non-
informative stale performance chasing signals. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Advertising acts to reduce search costs. During periods of 
heightened investor uncertainty in financial markets, funds which advertise HPR 
results should realize incremental greater flow sensitivity to stale performance 
chasing signals. 
 
 As proxies for financial market conditions we use: 1) the VIX volatility index maintained 
by the Chicago Board Option Exchange and 2) National Activity Index (CFNAI) produced by 
the Chicago Federal Reserve. Our motivation for the selection of these proxies is to include 
salient, real economy proxies easily observable by retail investors. CFNAI is the first principal 
component of 85 monthly series that come from the broad categories of production and income, 
employment and hours, consumption and housing, and sales, orders and inventories. It includes 
most of the series we would think of as being important indicators of current economic 
conditions (e.g. industrial production and unemployment). Similarly, the VIX captures implied 
volatility amongst the S&P 500 index constituent firms which proxies for aggregate financial 
market uncertainty.  
The results of the time series determinants of stale performance chasing appear in Table 
V. In these models, we include as controls the non-advertising related proxies for fund exposure 
but in the interest of brevity, suppress the coefficient values for the controls. Focusing first on the 
economic condition proxies, during periods of financial market uncertainty (high values of VIX 
and low value of CFNAI), flow sensitivity to stale performance chasing signals increases. The 
coefficients on the interaction of fund specific advertising which includes horizon specific 
information with the financial market condition proxies are negative and significant. Similarly, 
funds which feature analyst rating induce incremental stale return chasing during periods of 
uncertainty. The coefficients on the interaction of fund specific advertising without horizon 
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specific data or analyst rating with the financial market condition proxies are all insignificant. To 
summarize these results, in times of uncertainty in financial markets, investors are more likely to 
respond to non-informative stale performance chasing signals and these effects are incrementally 
more pronounced for funds which advertise HPR results or analyst rating during times of stress 
in financial markets. Again we implement the same series of robustness tests and our conclusions 
are unaffected. 
 
7. Do mutual funds change their fees to take advantage of stale performance 
chasing?  
Our final analysis examines the implications of stale performance chasing for investors. 
To an extent, some of the implications of stale performance chasing behavior are already well 
understood. Regardless of whether investors are reacting to contemporaneous or lagged 
performance signals, as shown by Berk and Green (2004) and Chen et al. (2004), as assets under 
management expand, economies of scale diminish resulting in a decline in performance with 
fund size. Lou (2012) similarly documents significant and temporary price impacts of flow-
induced trading across mutual funds, which reverse in subsequent years. However, other 
implications may exist beyond scale effects. Mutual fund fees are set in a competitive 
environment. Funds that wish to increase fees are likely to time the increase to special situations. 
For example, Bris, Gulen, Kadiyala, and Rau (2006) show that mutual funds choose to raise fees 
at points in time when they close their funds to new investors. Thus, beyond the understood 
performance implications, stale performance chasing may provide mutual funds with the 
opportunity to increase fees, in essence cashing in on the mechanical effects of HPRs. 
To test this hypothesis, we relate fees to our return-chasing estimates. Following 
Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2009) who examine the determinants of mutual fund fees around 
the world, in these models we include as controls: 1) fund and family-level visibility proxies 
including size, age and the number of funds in the family, 2) fund change in market share and 
performance as funds and families with stronger performance and asset inflows are in a stronger 
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competitive position to charge higher fees, 3) fund fees, 4) fund market share standard deviation 
as a proxy for fund value uncertainty and 5) the aggregate TNA of the funds in the same 
objective classification as a proxy for the level of competition between funds with a given 
management strategy. Fund and family performance is measured using Fama and French (1993) 
and Carhart (1997) 4-factor alphas, with family performance measured as the average alpha to all 
equity funds in the family. The results are reported in Table VI. 
We use two return-chasing measures. The first is calculated as in equation (1) but using 
fund return in excess of the objective value-weighted mean return (Excess βn). The second is 
calculated by relating aggregate change in market share to all funds in objective j to the objective 
j value-weighted mean return (Objective βn). These separate return-chasing measures allow us to 
differentiate between idiosyncratic and objective based return-chasing effects of fees.  
Focusing first on the %Fee regressions in Panel A of Table VI, we find that funds with 
higher stale return-chasing in the prior period typically charge higher fees as a percentage of 
TNA. The magnitude of the effect is similar between fund and objective-level stale return 
signals. On average, a 1 standard deviation increase in return-chasing (Excess βn) across the three 
models is associated with a 10.5% increase in fees. A joint 1 standard deviation shift in Excess βn 
and Objective βn is associated with a 20.1% increase in fees. Turning briefly to the controls, 
funds with higher alphas, higher investor allocations (proxied by change in market share) and 
higher Morningstar ratings typically charge higher fees. Fund size and family size is typically 
related to lower fees, consistent with size being related to stronger governance (Guercio, Dan and 
Partch, 2003). 
Although contractual fees are typically time invariant and may only be changed with 
shareholder consent, mutual funds routinely voluntarily waive fees during periods of poor 
performance in order to retain performance-sensitive investors (Christoffersen, 2001). To test 
this channel, we obtain fee waiver data from Morningstar, which reports the percentage of TNA 
waived from fees in a given year. We then relate the change in waived fees to the stale 
performance chasing estimates and control variables (models (4) to (6)). The stale performance 
chasing coefficients are all positive and significant, suggesting that funds reduce waived fees on 
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the heels of stale performance chasing flow. The absolute sizes of the coefficient estimates 
across the model sets are highly similar, suggesting that adjustment to waivers explains the 
majority of the change in fees associated with stale performance chasing. Thus, our results 
suggest a channel by which managers are able to realize opportunities to return fees to prior 
levels without having to generate exceptional returns, i.e. by waiting for mechanical increases in 
HPRs realized as time passes. 
The results in Panel A of Table VI suggest that mutual fees are higher for mutual funds 
held by more stale return-sensitive investors. We next explore a more direct linkage between 
HPRs and mutual fund price setting. In Panel B, we replicate the models from Panel A, relating 
the change in fund waivers to HPRs over the 1, 3 and 5 year horizon. The same set of control 
variables is included in Panel B, but we do not report the coefficients in the interest of brevity. 
Focusing first on the full model, we find an inverse relation between the change in waivers and 
HPRs at all three horizons, suggesting waivers decrease following increases in reported returns. 
As in Table III, we then partition the models by 
	
or 
	
  (the end-return that drops 
from the three and five year HPR, respectively). We expect that fee increases will be 
incrementally higher when the improvement in HPR results from relatively lower end-returns 
dropping from the horizon of analysis. This relation would be consistent with funds taking 
advantage of incremental fund demand resulting from end-return related improvements in HPRs 
which have been made more visible to investors via advertising. Consistent with this thesis, we 
find statistically significant differences in the magnitude of waiver decreases associated with 
end-return related HPR increases. For both the three and five year HPR, fee increases are higher 
when investor demand is driven by stale as opposed to recent performance. 
To summarize these results, we document a channel by which mutual funds exploit naïve 
or inattentive investors, benefiting from their inability to differentiate between the stale and 
current information components which jointly influence the change in HPR. Stale return chasing 
creates investor demand, in turn, creating opportunities for annulation of previously offered fee 
waivers. The resultant realized fees increase harms current investors who pay higher fees to hold 
the same fund. Quantifying harm to naïve investors who are enticed to purchase the fund via 
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uninformative persuasion is more difficult, as the counterfactual performance of the investment 
they would have alternatively held cannot be observed. Unreported results suggest that the 
performance of funds affected by high stale return chasing is not significantly different from 
other funds, after controlling for fees, fund size and portfolio turnover (all underperform the 
market on average). However new investors also pay higher fees to hold the same fund. As 
previously discussed, all holders of the fund are also exposed to greater potential diseconomies 
of scale with its related drag on performance. 
 
8. Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate if horizon effects in reported performance affect investor 
allocations to mutual funds. Specifically, we examine changes in reported HPR values in mutual 
fund advertisements. Changes in HPRs are equally influenced by the most recent return which 
enters and the end-return which drops from the horizon of the HPR calculation. Thus, as time 
passes, prior poor performance mechanically drops from the horizon of the HPR sample, 
potentially creating the misperception of improved fund performance.  
Our analysis suggests that investors fail to recognize the effect of horizons on HPR 
calculations, allocating disproportionate wealth to funds when negative stale performance drops 
from the horizon. Stale performance chasing is more pronounced in fund families that advertise 
HPR information and is more prevalent during periods of stress and uncertainty in financial 
markets. Fund families that advertise HPR information during these periods realize incrementally 
greater stale performance chasing behaviour. Either due to naivety or limited attention, investors 
misinterpret changes in HPRs, failing to distinguish between the relevant and stale information 
components of reported performance.  
Finally, we show that mutual funds appear to time fee increases to coincide with periods 
of stale performance chasing, taking advantage of unsophisticated investors who do not 
appreciate the mechanical effect of time on HPRs. Our results suggest that the form in which 
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mutual fund performance is advertised and resultant horizon effects are important influences of 
investor behavior.  
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Table I 
Stale Performance Chasing Measurement 
 
This table reports the return-chasing coefficient (βn) from the series of 72 separate pooled OLS regressions: Panel A and C: ∆mt = α + β1Returnt-1 + βnReturnt-n + εt, and 
Panel B: Flowt = α + β1Returnt-1 + βnReturnt-n + εt, for all values of n from 2 to 73. Each regression generates a Returnt-1 coefficient and an additional unique lagged return 
coefficient (Returnt-n). The Returnt-n coefficient values are reported below. The average Returnt-1 coefficient value from the 72 regressions in Panel A is 0.31 (significant 
at the 1% level). Two t-statistics are reported. The first (Reg. t-stat) tests the null  H0: βn =0. The second (Diff. t-stat) tests the null H0: βn = ∑ ||


. T-test statistics are 
clustered by fund and date (month-year). In Panels A and C, the dependent variable mt, is market share defined as mutual fund total net assets (TNA) divided by the total 
TNA of all funds in the sample in month t. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the percentage growth in mutual fund total net assets (TNA), defined as: (TNAi,t –TNAi,t-
1×(1+Returni,t))/TNAi,t-1 in month t for fund i. The sample includes all domestic, actively managed mutual funds in the U.S. between 1992 and 2010. Return coefficients 
coinciding with the end of commonly reported holding period returns (1, 3, and 5 years) appear in bold face. The output for all 72 regressions are reported in Panels A-C. 
Panel D tests a parsimonious version of Panel C. In the interest of brevity, in Panel E only the coefficients of interest are reported (the full output is available in the 
online appendix to the paper). In Panel C, the return coefficients are estimated simultaneously in one model. In Panel E, in addition to market share, an additional proxy 
for investor preferences used in model 6: N-SAR net sales calculated as the difference between share sales and redemptions reported directly by the fund in form N-
SAR. Controls included in select models in Panel E include log fund TNA, log fund age measured from the date of fund inception to the start of the year of βn estimation, 
log number of funds offered by the investment company (family) of the fund, log total family TNA, fund return standard deviation calculated over the prior year based 
on the fund’s monthly returns, Morningstar rating, the change in Morningstar rating, portfolio turnover measured as the percentage of average total net assets traded in 
year t, and expense ratio measured as the percentage of total net assets which investors pay for the fund’s operating expenses. 
 
Panel A: Base Model with market share 
 
Rt-2 Rt-3 Rt-4 Rt-5 Rt-6 Rt-7 Rt-8 Rt-9 Rt-10 Rt-11 Rt-12 Rt-13 
Coef. 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.08 -0.26 0.26 0.07 0.17 0.06 0.11 -0.19 -0.33 
Reg. t-stat 1.40 1.52 2.24 1.32 -3.14 3.19 1.01 2.37 0.86 1.67 -2.79 -4.11 
Diff. t-stat -0.80 -0.73 0.25 -0.98 1.35 1.39 -1.16 0.32 -1.15 -0.58 0.66 2.30 
N 425,781 423,464 421,101 418,218 415,466 413,988 411,269 408,523 405,527 402,662 400,511 397,586 
Adjusted R
2
 24.85% 24.64% 24.41% 24.18% 23.94% 23.76% 23.58% 23.46% 23.34% 23.21% 23.04% 22.85% 
Rt-14 Rt-15 Rt-16 Rt-17 Rt-18 Rt-19 Rt-20 Rt-21 Rt-22 Rt-23 Rt-24 Rt-25 
Coef. -0.29 0.10 0.08 0.19 -0.27 0.17 0.09 0.08 -0.22 -0.11 -0.18 -0.27 
Reg. t-stat -3.91 1.44 1.22 2.62 -3.73 2.46 1.41 1.33 -3.02 -1.66 -2.51 -3.33 
Diff. t-stat 1.94 -0.73 -1.03 0.57 1.73 0.35 -0.76 -0.98 1.07 -0.61 0.48 1.51 
N 403,507 400,578 398,413 395,794 394,029 391,120 389,669 387,184 385,720 382,822 381,436 378,767 
Adjusted R
2
 22.79% 22.67% 22.54% 22.38% 22.17% 21.97% 21.80% 21.65% 21.49% 21.31% 21.17% 20.99% 
Rt-26 Rt-27 Rt-28 Rt-29 Rt-30 Rt-31 Rt-32 Rt-33 Rt-34 Rt-35 Rt-36 Rt-37 
Coef. 0.08 0.23 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.01 -0.01 -0.19 -0.25 -0.43 
Reg. t-stat 1.20 3.10 1.74 1.86 1.39 1.96 2.03 0.33 -0.14 -2.55 -3.12 -4.30 
Diff. t-stat -1.06 1.12 -0.29 -0.25 -0.88 -0.01 0.01 -4.26 -2.07 0.55 1.33 2.85 
N 380,512 377,904 375,120 373,385 371,617 369,063 366,879 365,162 363,731 361,676 359,114 357,322 
Adjusted R
2
 20.36% 20.16% 20.05% 19.91% 19.78% 19.66% 19.48% 19.29% 19.10% 18.98% 18.81% 18.65% 
  
 Rt-38 Rt-39 Rt-40 Rt-41 Rt-42 Rt-43 Rt-44 Rt-45 Rt-46 Rt-47 Rt-48 Rt-49 
Coef. -0.19 -0.19 0.12 0.10 0.13 -0.18 -0.16 -0.27 0.13 0.15 0.13 -0.17 
Reg. t-stat -2.95 -2.95 1.68 1.64 1.92 -2.52 -2.12 -3.54 1.92 2.06 1.87 -2.49 
Diff. t-stat 0.73 0.74 -0.42 -0.63 -0.22 0.49 0.17 1.61 -0.17 0.02 -0.24 0.41 
N 348,012 344,491 341,421 338,142 334,007 331,006 328,159 324,349 320,266 317,078 313,458 310,568 
Adjusted R
2
 18.20% 18.02% 17.91% 17.78% 17.67% 17.52% 17.40% 17.28% 17.11% 17.00% 16.83% 16.72% 
Rt-50 Rt-51 Rt-52 Rt-53 Rt-54 Rt-55 Rt-56 Rt-57 Rt-58 Rt-59 Rt-60 Rt-61 
Coef. 0.10 0.09 0.18 0.07 0.15 0.08 -0.12 -0.19 -0.13 0.19 0.14 -0.28 
Reg. t-stat 1.56 1.34 2.53 1.01 2.10 1.11 -1.72 -2.77 -1.80 2.92 1.92 -3.74 
Diff. t-stat -0.68 -0.85 0.53 -1.08 0.09 -1.01 -0.35 0.64 -0.27 0.69 -0.08 1.80 
N 308,801 304,975 302,097 298,173 295,673 292,895 290,368 287,747 284,090 280,348 277,562 274,148 
Adjusted R
2
 16.55% 16.45% 16.30% 16.19% 16.03% 15.91% 15.76% 15.66% 15.55% 15.41% 15.29% 15.21% 
Rt-62 Rt-63 Rt-64 Rt-65 Rt-66 Rt-67 Rt-68 Rt-69 Rt-70 Rt-71 Rt-72 Rt-73 
Coef. 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.07 -0.15 -0.10 0.08 0.10 0.06 
Reg. t-stat 1.26 0.99 1.71 1.33 1.40 0.91 1.07 -2.07 -1.63 1.28 1.50 0.87 
Diff. t-stat -1.07 -1.21 -0.4 -0.86 -0.85 -1.16 -1.09 0.08 -0.67 -0.99 -0.73 -1.15 
N 270,880 268,244 264,796 261,989 258,582 255,066 251,679 248,800 245,620 243,126 240,018 237,237 
Adjusted R
2
 14.76% 14.62% 14.49% 14.35% 14.25% 14.16% 14.03% 13.95% 13.87% 13.75% 13.67% 13.58% 
 
 
Panel B: Base model with flows 
 
Rt-2 Rt-3 Rt-4 Rt-5 Rt-6 Rt-7 Rt-8 Rt-9 Rt-10 Rt-11 Rt-12 Rt-13 
Coef. 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.09 -0.22 0.23 0.09 0.21 0.08 0.10 -0.20 -0.28 
Reg. t-stat 1.53 1.23 2.08 1.29 -3.04 3.06 1.30 2.92 1.00 1.52 -2.67 -3.60 
Diff. t-stat -0.47 -0.73 -0.05 -0.77 -1.06 -1.15 -0.78 -0.92 -0.8 -0.66 -0.75 -1.76 
N 425,781 423,464 421,101 418,218 415,466 413,988 411,269 408,523 405,527 402,662 400,511 397,586 
Adjusted R
2
 25.55% 25.32% 25.14% 24.93% 24.80% 24.64% 24.43% 24.28% 24.11% 23.91% 23.77% 23.61% 
Rt-14 Rt-15 Rt-16 Rt-17 Rt-18 Rt-19 Rt-20 Rt-21 Rt-22 Rt-23 Rt-24 Rt-25 
Coef. -0.21 0.08 0.10 0.23 -0.23 0.14 0.11 0.11 -0.18 -0.09 -0.18 -0.27 
Reg. t-stat -2.94 1.02 1.52 3.13 -3.17 2.09 1.53 1.54 -2.43 -1.33 -2.43 -3.59 
Diff. t-stat -0.93 -0.81 -0.66 -1.18 -1.19 -0.05 -0.47 -0.47 -0.49 -0.79 -0.49 -1.68 
N 403,507 400,578 398,413 395,794 394,029 391,120 389,669 387,184 385,720 382,822 381,436 378,767 
Adjusted R
2
 22.98% 22.83% 22.64% 22.50% 22.36% 22.18% 22.03% 21.81% 21.67% 21.47% 21.30% 21.13% 
Rt-26 Rt-27 Rt-28 Rt-29 Rt-30 Rt-31 Rt-32 Rt-33 Rt-34 Rt-35 Rt-36 Rt-37 
Coef. 0.09 0.19 0.12 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.01 -0.01 -0.21 -0.21 -0.38 
Reg. t-stat 1.37 2.53 1.84 2.14 1.03 1.85 2.24 0.21 -0.34 -2.94 -3.00 -3.78 
Diff. t-stat -0.82 -0.62 -0.36 -0.09 -0.82 -0.36 -0.1 -2.75 -4.51 -0.93 -0.95 2.35 
N 380,512 377,904 375,120 373,385 371,617 369,063 366,879 365,162 363,731 361,676 359,114 357,322 
Adjusted R
2
 23.29% 23.09% 22.90% 22.71% 22.52% 22.32% 22.19% 21.97% 21.78% 21.58% 21.40% 0.21 
  
Rt-38 Rt-39 Rt-40 Rt-41 Rt-42 Rt-43 Rt-44 Rt-45 Rt-46 Rt-47 Rt-48 Rt-49 
Coef. -0.22 -0.16 0.11 0.09 0.14 -0.20 -0.18 -0.23 0.11 0.18 0.11 -0.19 
Reg. t-stat -3.04 -2.42 1.61 1.39 2.12 -2.73 -2.45 -3.58 1.63 2.45 1.70 -2.54 
Diff. t-stat -1.06 -0.25 -0.49 -0.83 -0.05 -0.77 -0.5 -1.34 -0.5 -0.5 -0.52 -0.62 
N 348,012 344,491 341,421 338,142 334,007 331,006 328,159 324,349 320,266 317,078 313,458 310,568 
Adjusted R
2
 21.55% 21.42% 21.31% 21.19% 21.04% 20.87% 20.71% 20.51% 20.38% 20.25% 20.09% 19.96% 
Rt-50 Rt-51 Rt-52 Rt-53 Rt-54 Rt-55 Rt-56 Rt-57 Rt-58 Rt-59 Rt-60 Rt-61 
Coef. 0.13 0.11 0.19 0.08 0.19 0.09 -0.13 -0.20 -0.13 0.18 0.12 -0.28 
Reg. t-stat 1.98 1.72 2.59 1.04 2.67 1.41 -2.02 -2.90 -2.03 2.53 1.86 -3.77 
Diff. t-stat -0.21 -0.53 -0.63 -0.83 -0.65 -0.84 -0.21 -0.82 -0.21 -0.51 -0.37 -1.84 
N 308,801 304,975 302,097 298,173 295,673 292,895 290,368 287,747 284,090 280,348 277,562 274,148 
Adjusted R
2
 21.39% 21.27% 21.12% 20.94% 20.77% 20.62% 20.41% 20.27% 20.13% 19.97% 19.79% 19.67% 
Rt-62 Rt-63 Rt-64 Rt-65 Rt-66 Rt-67 Rt-68 Rt-69 Rt-70 Rt-71 Rt-72 Rt-73 
Coef. 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08 -0.16 -0.10 0.06 0.10 0.07 
Reg. t-stat 1.05 0.94 1.79 1.21 1.44 1.16 1.17 -2.28 -1.43 0.91 1.45 0.96 
Diff. t-stat -0.78 -1.04 -0.54 -0.74 -0.66 -0.85 -0.83 -0.22 0.67 -1.3 -0.64 -1.01 
N 270,880 268,244 264,796 261,989 258,582 255,066 251,679 248,800 245,620 243,126 240,018 237,237 
Adjusted R
2
 19.70% 19.59% 19.42% 19.28% 19.09% 18.98% 18.83% 18.67% 18.51% 18.38% 18.27% 18.11% 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Simultaneous Estimation Model (N=237,237, Adj. R
2
=27.90) 
 
Rt-2 Rt-3 Rt-4 Rt-5 Rt-6 Rt-7 Rt-8 Rt-9 Rt-10 Rt-11 Rt-12 Rt-13 
Coef. 0.12 0.11 0.15 -0.13 -0.40 -0.33 0.09 0.14 -0.05 0.10 -0.31 -0.42 
Reg. t-stat 1.70 1.51 2.15 -1.99 -4.22 -4.18 1.28 2.05 -0.73 1.39 -3.88 -4.38 
Diff. t-stat -0.34 -0.43 0.19 -0.16 2.75 2.40 -0.71 -0.05 -1.26 -0.62 2.10 2.91 
Rt-14 Rt-15 Rt-16 Rt-17 Rt-18 Rt-19 Rt-20 Rt-21 Rt-22 Rt-23 Rt-24 Rt-25 
Coef. 0.20 0.07 0.07 -0.13 -0.15 -0.17 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.05 -0.14 -0.21 
Reg. t-stat 2.88 0.99 1.00 -1.98 -2.08 -2.16 1.41 1.73 1.98 0.72 -2.02 -2.89 
Diff. t-stat 0.86 -1.13 -1.13 -0.21 0.06 0.31 -0.60 -0.33 -0.18 -1.43 -0.09 0.92 
Rt-26 Rt-27 Rt-28 Rt-29 Rt-30 Rt-31 Rt-32 Rt-33 Rt-34 Rt-35 Rt-36 Rt-37 
Coef. -0.16 0.18 0.14 -0.15 -0.11 0.13 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 0.17 -0.18 -0.29 
Reg. t-stat -2.15 2.57 2.03 -2.13 -1.50 1.86 1.50 -0.08 -0.10 2.20 -2.54 -3.51 
Diff. t-stat 0.25 0.58 -0.04 0.18 -0.44 -0.23 -0.47 -0.90 -1.02 0.33 0.54 1.78 
Rt-38 Rt-39 Rt-40 Rt-41 Rt-42 Rt-43 Rt-44 Rt-45 Rt-46 Rt-47 Rt-48 Rt-49 
Coef. 0.21 0.15 0.06 0.12 0.17 -0.18 -0.13 0.18 0.14 -0.12 -0.12 -0.10 
Reg. t-stat 2.99 2.12 0.84 1.64 2.33 -2.62 -1.87 2.85 2.04 -1.81 -1.60 -1.33 
Diff. t-stat 1.00 0.09 -1.01 -0.34 0.38 0.59 -0.23 0.65 -0.01 -0.30 -0.35 -0.62 
  
Rt-50 Rt-51 Rt-52 Rt-53 Rt-54 Rt-55 Rt-56 Rt-57 Rt-58 Rt-59 Rt-60 Rt-61 
Coef. -0.09 -0.12 0.18 0.07 0.24 0.10 0.20 0.20 -0.13 0.21 -0.11 -0.30 
Reg. t-stat -1.16 -1.82 2.43 0.92 3.15 1.39 2.85 2.85 -1.93 2.99 -1.50 -3.66 
Diff. t-stat -0.72 -0.30 0.49 -1.07 1.33 -0.63 0.83 0.79 -0.23 0.98 -0.45 1.95 
Rt-62 Rt-63 Rt-64 Rt-65 Rt-66 Rt-67 Rt-68 Rt-69 Rt-70 Rt-71 Rt-72 Rt-73 
Coef. 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.07 -0.12 -0.10 0.06 0.10 0.06 
Reg. t-stat 1.29 0.85 1.60 1.10 1.53 1.10 1.08 -1.67 -1.48 0.90 1.43 0.79 
Diff. t-stat -0.66 -1.02 -0.37 -0.84 -0.39 -0.97 -0.96 -0.34 -0.59 -1.08 -0.59 -1.23 
 
Panel D: Base model with flows 
 
 
Model (1) (2) 
Rt  0.45
***
 
  (4.17) 
Rt-1 0.39
***
 0.34
***
 
 (4.43) (3.54) 
Rt-1,t-12 0.06
**
 0.06
**
 
 (2.16) (2.23) 
Rt-13 -0.30
***
 -0.32
***
 
 (-3.16) (-3.71) 
Rt-15,t-36 0.01
**
 0.01
**
 
 (2.27) (2.37) 
Rt-37 -0.37
***
 -0.40
***
 
 (-4.64) (-3.78) 
R t-39,t-60 0.01 0.02
**
 
 (1.85) (2.37) 
Rt-61 -0.26
***
 -0.29
***
 
 (-3.27) (-4.01) 
N 237,237 237,237 
Adjusted R
2 
36.21% 38.17% 
Coefficients are reported with difference t-statistics (as defined in Table 1 of the main paper) reported in brackets. Coefficients significant at the  1% and 5% 
levels are marked with *** and ** respectively.
  
 
 
Panel E: Robustness Tests and Extensions 
 
Model Dep. Var. Clustered S.E. Fixed Effects Controls  Rt-13 Rt-37 Rt-61 
(1) ∆ Market Share Fund, Date No No  -0.33 -0.43 -0.28 
      (-4.11) (-2.85) (-3.74) 
(2) ∆ Market Share Fund, Time, Family No No  -0.33 -0.43 -0.28 
      (-3.62) (-4.44) (-3.45) 
(3) ∆ Market Share Fund, Date No Yes  -0.34 -0.36 -0.23 
      (-3.79) (-4.31) (-2.96) 
(4) ∆ Market Share Fund, Date Fund Objective No  -0.26 -0.35 -0.30 
      (-3.72) (-3.44) (-3.20) 
(5) ∆ Market Share Fund, Date Fund Objective Yes  -0.33 -0.34 -0.35 
      (-3.58) (-4.11) (-4.63) 
(6) N-SAR Net Sales Fund, Date No No  -0.34 -0.39 -0.41 
      (-3.61) (-3.68) (-3.75) 
 
 
Interpretation: This table demonstrates that investors allocate disproportionate capital to funds with negative returns 13, 37, and 61 
months prior. These returns coincide with the end of commonly reported holding periods for mutual funds, suggesting that investors 
are unable to differentiate between improvements in HPRs which result from high recent returns (Returnt-1) relative to 
improvements related to negative returns dropping from the horizon of the HPR calculation.  
  
Table II 
Advertising Expenditure Dataset Summary Statistics  
 
This table summarizes investment company advertising expenditures in print media in the U.S. by year (thousand USD). 
Expenditures are segmented between magazine and newspaper advertisements. Magazine advertisement expenditures are 
subsequently segmented by whether the advertisement promotes mutual funds or promotes another product or service 
provided by the mutual fund company. Expenditures focused on mutual fund advertising are subsequently segmented by: 1) 
expenditures that promote a specific fund relative to broad family based promotion, 2) expenditures which promote holding 
period returns (HPR) by horizon, 3) expenditures which promote rankings provided by Morningstar or another analyst by 
horizon and 4) analyst rankings not by horizon. Greater detail regarding the establishment of the partitions is provided in the 
Appendix. 
 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total % of Total 
All Advertising 
Newspaper 61,427 58,794 89,764 96,690 103,630 126,881 537,186 34 
Magazine 148,643 169,341 184,043 213,006 147,315 182,969 1,045,317 66 
Total 210,070 228,135 273,807 309,696 250,945 309,850 1,582,503  
         
Magazine Advertising 
Not Mutual Fund Focused  84,061 96,872 110,181 149,840 123,985 147,823 712,762 68 
Mutual Fund Focused 64,582 72,469 73,862 63,166 23,330 35,146 332,555 32 
         
Mutual Fund Focused Magazine Advertising 
Fund Specific 49,869 52,658 54,202 39,008 15,517 18,212 229,466 69 
Family 14,713 19,811 19,660 24,158 7,813 16,934 103,089 31 
         
Fund Specific Magazine Advertising 
Advertise HPR by Horizon 28,535 23,605 20,857 13,666 1,615 1,675 89,953 39 
Advertise Rank by Horizon 6,363 2,634 2,003 3,818 2,144 938 17,900 8 
Advertise Analyst Rating 5,201 22,321 24,458 12,632 9,234 14,082 87,928 38 
Other Advertising 9,770 4,098 6,884 8,892 2,524 1,517 33,685 15 
 
Interpretation: Investment company advertising expenditure promoting mutual funds is cyclical. 
It is higher during periods of strong market performance. 
 
   
Table III 
Determinants of Holding Period Return Advertising Expenditures  
 
In this table, the dependent variable is the change in spending on fund specific advertising that features holding period return data or analyst rating in year T standardized 
by fund size. The key independent variables are holding period returns (HPR) calculated using monthly returns over the prior 1, 3, and 5 year horizons (for example, 

		refers to the 3 year HPR ending in year T-1). The models are partitioned by the annual return that drops from the 3 and 5 year HPR horizon (i.e. the 1 year 
HPR 4 years prior 	

		  and the 1 year HPR 6 years prior 
		 . Controls include: the logarithm of: fund age measured from the date of fund inception to the 
start of the year of βn estimation, # of funds offered by the investment company (family) of the fund and total family TNA. Fund flow is the percentage growth in mutual 
fund TNA, defined as: (TNAi,t –TNAi,t-1×(1+Returni,t))/TNAi,t-1 in month t for fund i. Fund flow standard deviation is calculated using monthly fund flow over the prior 
year. Market return is the return to the S&P 500 index. Expense ratio, front end load, back end load and portfolio turnover are calculated as TNA weighted mean values 
across all available share classes of each fund. Expense ratio and turnover for each share class is the percentage of TNA charged as operating expenses and the 
percentage of TNA traded per annum, respectively. Morningstar rating is the number of stars (1 to 5) assigned to the fund in Morningstar’s fund rating system. The 
regressions include time fixed effects. Standardized coefficient values are reported with t-statistics in parentheses calculated with standard errors clustered by fund. 
Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by 
*
, 
**
, 
***
, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Advertising Spending that Features HPR Information 
 
Dependent Variable ∆ Spending on advertising featuring HPR information T / logTNA 
Partition Variable Full Sample  

		  
		 
Model/Partition (1) (2) (3) (4)  Low Mid High L-H  Low Mid High L-H 

		  0.20
**
    0.24
***
   0.24
***
 0.09 0.07 0.16
*
  0.27
***
 0.09
*
  0.10
**
  0.17
**
 
 
(2.31)   (3.70)  (3.41) (1.62) (1.21) (1.95) (3.93) (1.91) (2.28) (2.26) 

		   0.25
***
   0.21
***
   0.38
***
 0.26
***
 0.06 0.32
***
  0.36
***
 0.17
**
  0.06
**
  0.30
***
 
 
 (3.69)  (2.88)  (4.85) (4.54) (1.49) (4.18) (4.06) (2.61) (2.08) (3.05) 

		    0.38
***
  0.25
***
   0.23
***
 0.08  0.07
**
 0.17
*
  0.23
***
  0.11
***
 0.08
*
 0.15
**
 
 
  (4.64) (4.25)  (3.06) (1.74) (2.21) (1.77) (4.15) (2.68) (1.85) (2.34) 
Log Family TNA T-1  0.23
***
 0.10
*
  0.21
***
 0.09  0.14
***
 0.10  0.15
***
  0.11
*
 0.08
**
  0.12
*
  
 
(3.63) (1.78) (2.90) (1.63)  (3.15) (1.73) (3.24)  (1.79) (2.22) (1.81)  
Fund Flow T-1 -0.13  -0.22
***
 -0.17
*
 -0.14
**
  -0.13
**
 -0.10
*
 -0.10
**
  -0.10
*
 -0.13
**
 -0.11
*
  
 
(-1.33) (-3.17) (-1.87) (-2.38)  (-2.20) (-1.93) (-2.32)  (-1.95) (-2.43) (-1.66)  
Log Fund Age T-1 -0.10  -0.15
***
  -0.14
***
 -0.14  -0.22
***
 -0.20
***
  -0.14
***
   -0.19
***
  -0.19
***
  -0.22
***
  
 
(-1.34) (-3.20) (-3.34) (-1.55)  (-3.68) (-3.72) (-2.91)  (-3.87) (-2.77) (-2.74)  
Fund Flow Std T-1  0.35
***
  0.21
**
  0.30
***
  0.22
***
  0.18
***
 0.21
***
  0.25
***
   0.20
***
 0.23
***
  0.24
***
  
 
(4.97) (2.53) (4.63) (2.72)  (2.89) (2.68) (4.64)  (2.99) (3.40) (2.67)  
Market Return T-1  0.13
*
 0.13
*
  0.15
***
  0.13
**
  0.14
**
 0.13
**
  0.10
**
   0.13
***
 0.16
**
  0.13
**
  
 
(1.91) (1.69) (3.33) (2.39)  (2.49) (2.03) (2.15)  (2.71) (2.24) (2.54)  
Expense Ratio T-1  0.17
***
 0.14  0.19
***
  0.16
***
  0.10
***
 0.07
*
 0.08
**
   0.08
**
  0.11
**
 0.10
*
  
 
(3.60) (1.58) (3.09) (4.20)  (2.91) (1.90) (2.30)  (2.17) (2.01) (1.69)  
Front End Load T-1  0.22
***
  0.18
***
  0.32
***
  0.18
***
  0.32
***
 0.27
***
  0.24
***
   0.31
***
  0.30
***
  0.20
**
  
 
(2.96) (3.54) (3.32) (2.63)  (5.02) (3.28) (3.97)  (3.66) (4.07) (2.47)  
Back End Load T-1 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
*
  0.03
*
 0.03
*
 0.03  0.02 0.03 0.03  
 
(1.54) (1.36) (0.99) (1.66)  (1.74) (1.79) (1.50)  (1.38) (1.32) (1.48)  
   
Turnover T-1  0.07
*
 0.08  0.08
**
 0.04  0.02 0.02 0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02  
 
(1.84) (1.57) (2.26) (1.50)  (0.86) (0.81) (0.72)  (0.69) (0.53) (1.07)  
Morningstar Rating T-1  0.16
***
  0.16
***
  0.12
**
  0.14
***
   0.09
**
  0.11
**
  0.07
*
   0.08
*
 0.06 0.07  
 
(3.64) (2.94) (2.18) (2.94)  (2.53) (2.36) (1.69)  (1.69) (1.42) (1.47)  
∆ Morningstar Rating T-1  0.17
**
  0.16
**
  0.17
***
  0.17
**
   0.23
***
 0.13
*
 0.07    0.25
***
  0.12
*
 0.05  
 (2.07) (2.48) (2.82) (2.04)  (2.80) (1.87) (1.55)   (2.81) (1.73) (1.32)  
Adjusted R
2
 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.38  0.34 0.33 0.25  0.38 0.32 0.26  
N 21,219 21,219 21,219 21,219  18,054 18,054 18,052   16,416 16,416 16,416  
 
   
Panel B: Advertising Spending that Features Analyst Rating Information 
  
Dependent Variable ∆ Spending on advertising featuring analyst rating information T / logTNA 
Partition Variable Full Sample  

		  
		 
Model/Partition (1) (2) (3) (4)  Low Mid High L-H  Low Mid High L-H 

		  0.19
**
    0.24
***
   0.21
***
  0.10
**
 0.07 0.14  0.23
***
  0.09
**
  0.09
**
 0.14 
 
(2.29)   (3.97)  (3.61) (2.01) (1.08) (1.63) (3.06) (2.04) (2.27) (1.65) 

		   0.24
***
   0.26
***
   0.34
***
  0.24
***
 0.08  0.27
***
  0.46
***
  0.19
**
 0.05  0.41
***
 
 
 (3.88)  (3.29)  (3.57) (2.75) (1.45) (2.63) (5.63) (2.36) (1.46) (4.46) 

		    0.35
***
  0.22
***
   0.26
***
  0.10
***
 0.06
*
  0.20
**
  0.26
***
  0.11
***
 0.08
*
  0.19
***
 
 
  (5.25) (3.75)  (4.03) (2.67) (1.94) (2.59) (3.85) (2.71) (1.82) (2.14) 
Log Family TNA T-1  0.19
***
  0.13
**
  0.18
***
  0.11
**
   0.16
***
  0.10
*
  0.14
***
        0.10
*
  0.11
***
  0.12
**
  
 
(2.67) (2.21) (2.99) (2.32)  (3.22) (1.96) (3.06)  (1.75) (2.86) (2.03)  
Fund Flow T-1 -0.18
*
  -0.17
**
  -0.19
**
  -0.17
***
   -0.12
**
  -0.13
***
 -0.08
*
  -0.10
**
 -0.11
*
 -0.12
**
  
 
(-1.87) (-2.39) (-2.60) (-3.28)  (-2.14) (-2.51) (-1.70)  (-2.04) (-1.73) (-2.06)  
Log Fund Age T-1  -0.13
**
  -0.15
***
  -0.13
**
 -0.13   -0.23
***
  -0.17
**
  -0.17
***
   -0.17
***
 -0.17
*
  -0.18
**
  
 
(-2.30) (-3.30) (-2.10) (-1.53)  (-3.55) (-2.43) (-4.09)  (-2.66) (-1.90) (-2.19)  
Fund Flow Std T-1  0.32
***
  0.28
***
  0.25
***
  0.30
***
   0.18
***
  0.19
***
  0.24
***
   0.26
***
  0.25
***
  0.22
**
  
 
(3.40) (3.83) (2.76) (3.83)  (4.07) (2.89) (2.73)  (3.63) (3.83) (2.38)  
Market Return T-1  0.13
*
  0.16
**
  0.13
**
 0.10   0.15
**
  0.14
*
  0.13
***
  0.13
*
 0.12
*
  0.12
***
  
 
(1.88) (2.43) (2.18) (1.65)  (2.37) (1.98) (2.82)  (1.86) (1.69) (2.70)  
Expense Ratio T-1  0.15
**
  0.16
**
  0.21
***
  0.14
**
   0.09
**
 0.07
*
  0.08
***
   0.09
***
 0.12
*
 0.11
*
  
 
(2.59) (2.54) (4.53) (2.55)  (2.57) (1.78) (2.67)  (3.00) (1.89) (1.93)  
Front End Load T-1  0.19
**
    0.21
***
  0.35
***
 0.14     0.31
***
   0.25
***
  0.23
***
   0.33
***
  0.30
***
  0.24
***
  
 
(2.07) (3.07) (3.22) (1.57)  (4.81) (3.75) (4.87)  (3.42) (3.85) (3.90)  
Back End Load T-1 0.04  0.04
*
 0.06 0.03  0.04 0.03 0.04  0.04
*
 0.03
*
 0.03  
 
(1.15) (1.68) (1.30) (1.05)  (1.63) (1.40) (1.29)  (1.87) (1.87) (1.52)  
Turnover T-1 0.07
*
  0.11
*
 0.09
*
 0.05  0.02 0.02 0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02  
 
(1.78) (1.93) (1.99) (1.46)  (0.57) (0.76) (0.80)  (0.89) (0.56) (0.65)  
Morningstar Rating T-1  0.13
**
  0.16
***
  0.11
**
  0.16
***
   0.10
**
 0.09
*
  0.09
**
  0.08
*
 0.07 0.08
*
  
 
(2.05) (3.06) (2.01) (3.45)  (2.12) (1.79) (2.10)  (1.66) (1.46) (1.84)  
∆ Morningstar Rating T-1  0.21
***
  0.17
***
  0.14
**
  0.18
***
   0.24
**
  0.17
***
 0.07    0.24
***
  0.15
***
 0.05  
 (3.36) (3.12) (2.32) (3.43)  (2.44) (3.08) (1.28)   (2.87) (2.57) (1.16)  
Adjusted R
2
 0.22 0.32 0.36 0.28  0.32 0.31 0.28  0.35 0.31 0.28  
N 21,219 21,219 21,219 21,219  16,032 16,033 16,033   15,298 15,297 15,297  
 
 
Interpretation: These tables relate annual advertising spending to the one, three, and five year HPR. Mutual fund advertising that 
features either HPR information (Panel A) or analyst ratings (Panel B) is positively related to past performance (models 1-4). 
However, the effect is most significant for cases when the fourth (or sixth) year HPR that drops off from the annual 3 and 5 return 
calculations is the worst.  
   
 
Table IV 
Cross-sectional Determinants of Stale Performance Chasing 
 
The dependent variable is the annual frequency time series of coefficients (βn) from the regressions: ∆mt = α + β1Returnt-1 + 
βnReturnt-n + εt, for n= 13, 37, and 61, where mt is market share defined as mutual fund total net assets (TNA) divided by the 
total TNA of all funds in the sample in month t. Independent variables are the logarithm of: fund TNA, fund age measured 
from the date of fund inception to the start of the year of βn estimation, # of funds offered by the investment company 
(family) of the fund and total family TNA. Fund Return and Fund Return Standard Deviation (Std) are calculated over the 
prior year based on the fund’s monthly returns. Morningstar rating is the number of stars (1 to 5) assigned to the fund in 
Morningstar’s fund rating system. Advertising is considered fund specific if it mentions at least one fund by name and is 
otherwise classified as family advertising. Fund specific advertising is subsequently partitioned by whether the fund 
mentions the fund of interest, if holding period return data is provided or ranking by HPR are mentioned, if the ad features 
an analyst rating in the absence of HPR info, or the ad provides other non-HPR or analyst type info. 12b-1 is the 12b-1 fee 
charged by the fund. The regressions include time fixed effects. Standardized coefficient values are reported with t-statistics 
in parentheses. T-statistics are calculated with White (1980) heteroskedastic consistent standard errors clustered by fund. 
Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by 
*
, 
**
, 
***
, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variable β13,T  β37,T  β61,T 
Model (1)  (2)  (3) 
Log Fund TNAT-1  0.41
***
   0.19
***
   0.50
***
 
 (4.89)  (3.07)  (5.75) 
Log Fund AgeT-1 0.01   0.48
***
   0.14
***
 
 (1.29)  (3.56)  (3.06) 
Log # Funds in FamilyT-1 0.07  0.01  0.02 
 (1.26)  (1.44)  (1.30) 
Log Family TNAT-1  0.17
***
   0.53
***
   0.24
***
 
 (3.05)  (6.18)  (2.84) 
Fund Return Std.T-1  -0.13
***
  -0.14
*
   -0.20
***
 
 (-2.70)  (-1.84)  (-3.95) 
12b-1 T-1  -0.09
**
   -0.26
***
   -0.35
***
 
 (-2.05)  (-3.70)  (-3.44) 
Morningstar Rating T-1 -0.09
*
   -0.23
***
   -0.19
***
 
 (-1.84)  (-3.23)  (-2.83) 
∆Morningstar Rating T-1  -0.08   -0.12
**
   -0.16
***
 
 (-1.37)  (-2.23)  (-2.78) 
Family Non-Mutual Fund Ad Spending T-1 -0.03  -0.04  -0.04 
 (-1.23)  (-1.14)  (-1.50) 
Family Mutual Fund Ad Spending T-1  -0.13
**
   -0.16
**
   -0.15
**
 
 (-2.47)  (-2.54)  (-2.41) 
Fund Specific Ad Spending , Other FundT-1 -0.03  -0.03  -0.02 
 (-1.04)  (-0.50)  (-0.81) 
Fund Specific Ad Spending, HPRT-1  -0.16
***
   -0.23
***
   -0.21
***
 
 (-2.73)  (-3.49)  (-3.10) 
Fund Specific Ad Spending, No HPR, RatingT-1 -0.08
*
  -0.10
*
   -0.13
**
 
 (-1.82)  (-1.88)  (-2.56) 
Fund Specific Ad Spending, No HPR, No RatingT-1 -0.02  -0.04  -0.02 
 (-0.41)  (-0.35)  (-0.27) 
Institutional Fund Indicator T-1 -0.08   -0.09
**
  -0.06 
 (-1.47)  (-2.01)  (-1.52) 
Adjusted R
2 
0.37  0.38  0.40 
N 37,198  35,232  32,709 
 
Interpretation: This table explores the determinants of stale return chasing by investors. Stale 
return chasing is higher for funds with higher Morningstar ratings, increasing Morningstar 
ratings, and for funds that advertise HPR related information in magazine ads.   
   
Table V 
Time Series Determinants of Stale Performance Chasing 
 
In this table, the dependent variable is the annual frequency time series of coefficients (βn) from the regressions: ∆mt = 
α + β1Returnt-1 + βnReturnt-n + εt, for n= 13, 37 and 61, where mt is market share defined as mutual fund total net assets 
(TNA) divided by the total TNA of all funds in the sample in month t. Mutual Fund Ad Spending is the total 
expenditure on advertising in magazines that mention the fund of interest, partitioned by whether the ad reports horizon 
based information, analyst rating or neither. As proxies for market conditions we use: 1) the Chicago Board Option 
Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) and 2) the CFNAI index produced by the Chicago Federal Reserve. The regressions 
include time fixed effects. Standardized coefficient values are reported with t-statistics in parenthesis. T-statistics are 
calculated with White (1980) heteroskedastic consistent standard errors clustered by fund. Control variables from Table 
IV (fund visibility proxies and Morningstar Rating and ∆ Morningstar Rating) are included in the models, but are 
suppressed in the interest of brevity. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by 
*
, 
**
, 
***
, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable β13,T  β37,T  β61,T 
Model (1)  (2)  (3) 
VIXT-1  -0.40
***
   -0.11
**
   -0.37
***
 
 (-4.49)  (-2.03)  (-4.78) 
CFNAIT-1  0.12
*
   0.54
***
   0.38
***
 
 (1.70)  (6.83)  (6.93) 
General Ad SpendingT-1 -0.04
*
  -0.03  -0.03 
 (-1.76)  (-0.42)  (-0.92) 
Ad Spending HPR Data T-1  -0.14
**
   -0.18
***
   -0.11
**
 
 (-2.16)  (-3.45)  (-2.22) 
Fund Specific Ad Spending, No HPR, RatingT-1  -0.16
***
   -0.28
***
   -0.24
***
 
 (-2.68)  (-3.82)  (-3.73) 
Fund Specific Ad Spending, No HPR, No RatingT-1 -0.04  -0.07  -0.03 
 (-1.50)  (-1.62)  (-0.96) 
VIX × General Ad Spending T-1 -0.05  -0.03  -0.05 
 (-1.54)  (-0.65)  (-0.96) 
VIX × Fund Specific Ad Spending, HPRT-1  -0.20
***
   -0.19
**
  -0.11
*
 
 (-3.72)  (-2.41)  (-1.93) 
VIX × Fund Specific Ad Spending, No HPR, RatingT-1  -0.19
***
   -0.13
***
   -0.17
***
 
 (-3.14)  (-2.82)  (-2.98) 
VIX × Fund Specific Ad Spending, No HPR, No RatingT-1 -0.07
*
  -0.07
*
  -0.07
*
 
 (-1.65)  (-1.77)  (-1.74) 
1/CFNAI × General Ad Spending T-1 -0.05  -0.05  -0.03 
 (-0.66)  (-1.41)  (-1.51) 
1/CFNAI × Fund Specific Ad Spending, HPRT-1  -0.16
***
  -0.07
*
   -0.09
**
 
 (-2.54)  (-1.95)  (-2.05) 
1/CFNAI × Fund Specific Ad Spending, No HPR, RatingT-1  -0.12
**
   -0.07
**
  -0.09
*
 
 (-2.10)  (-2.10)  (-1.88) 
1/CFNAI × Fund Specific Ad Spending, No HPR, No RatingT-1 -0.05  -0.06  -0.07 
 (-1.38)  (-1.04)  (-1.35) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.35  0.36  0.36 
N 37,198  35,232  32,709 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
   
Interpretation: This table extends the examination of the determinants of stale return chasing 
in Table IV. Stale return chasing is higher when there is greater uncertainty in financial 
markets. Funds that advertise in these periods of uncertainty, realize incrementally greater 
stale return chasing.  
   
Table VI 
Stale Performance Chasing and Mutual Fund Fees 
In this table, we relate mutual fund expense ratios (Fee) and fee waivers to the annual frequency time series of holding 
period returns and coefficients (βn) from the regressions: ∆mt = α + β1Returnt-1 + βnReturnt-n + εt, for n = 13, 37, 61, where 
mt is market share defined as mutual fund total net assets (TNA) divided by the total TNA of all funds in the sample in 
month t. Expense ratio is the percentage of total net assets paid by investors for the fund’s operating expenses. Fee is total 
expenses paid by investors, expressed as a percentage of total net assets (%Fee). Fee waiver is the reduction in fees as a 
percentage of net assets applied to the expense ratio reported in the fund prospectus. The key independent variables are 
holding period returns (HPR) calculated using monthly returns over the prior 1, 3, and 5 year horizons (for example, 

		refers to the 3 year HPR ending in year T-1) The models are partitioned by the annual return that drops from the 3 
and 5 year HPR horizon (i.e. the 1 year HPR 4 years prior 	

		 and the 1 year HPR 6 years prior 
		). 
Objective and Excess fund βn values are reported where Objective βn is calculated by relating fund ∆mt to value-weighted 
mean objective returns and Excess βn is calculated by relating fund ∆mt to fund returns in excess of the value-weighted 
mean objective return. Control variables are as previously defined, except fund and family alpha which are calculated using 
the Fama-French 4-factor model. The models include time fixed effects. Standardized coefficient values are reported with t-
statistics in parenthesis. T-statistics are calculated with White (1980) heteroskedastic consistent standard errors clustered by 
fund. In Panel B, control variable coefficients values are suppressed in the interest of brevity. Significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels is indicated by 
*
, 
**
, 
***
, respectively. 
Panel A: Fees and Stale Performance Chasing 
Dependent Variable %FeeT   ∆%WaiverT 
 n=13 n=37 n=61   n=13 n=37 n=61 
Model (1) (2) (3)   (7) (8) (9) 
Objective βn,T-1  -0.20
**
  -0.24
***
  -0.25
***
    0.17
**
  0.21
***
  0.16
***
 
 (-2.25) (-4.25) (-3.78)   (2.12) (3.30) (3.21) 
Excess βn,T-1 -0.16
**
  -0.28
***
  -0.23
***
    0.21
***
  0.16
**
  0.29
**
 
 
(-2.27) (-4.52) (-3.64)   (3.24) (2.08) (2.28) 
Fund FeeT-1 0.12
*
  0.12
**
 0.07    -0.15
***
  -0.17
***
 -0.07 
 (1.95) (2.38) (1.16)   (-2.95) (-3.80) (-1.37) 
Fund AlphaT-1  0.24
***
  0.13
**
  0.25
***
    -0.23
***
  -0.17
***
  -0.18
**
 
 (3.46) (2.39) (2.67)   (-4.00) (-3.36) (-2.32) 
∆Market ShareT-1  0.16
***
  0.18
***
  0.10
**
    -0.11
**
  -0.12
**
 -0.09
*
 
 (2.91) (3.09) (2.08)   (-2.33) (-2.56) (-1.80) 
∆Market Share Std.T-1 -0.05 -0.09 -0.07   -0.05 -0.08
*
 -0.05 
 (-0.94) (-1.58) (-1.51)   (-1.22) (-1.70) (-1.63) 
Fund AgeT-1 0.01 0.01 0.02   0.01 0.01 0.02 
 (1.05) (1.40) (1.16)   (1.63) (1.55) (1.21) 
Log Fund TNAT-1  -0.09
***
  -0.09
**
 -0.05    0.09
**
 0.07
*
 0.04 
 (-2.62) (-2.04) (-1.59)   (2.04) (1.69) (0.93) 
Family AlphaT-1 0.15 0.16
**
  0.23
***
    -0.18
**
  -0.16
***
  -0.23
***
 
 (2.15) (2.40) (3.99)   (-2.05) (-4.32) (-4.05) 
Log Family TNAT-1  -0.11
***
 -0.06
*
 -0.11   0.11
*
 0.07
*
 0.13
**
 
 (-3.01) (-1.86) (-1.47)   (1.83) (1.67) (2.11) 
Log Objective TNAT-1 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01   -0.05 -0.02
*
 -0.01 
 (-1.29) (-1.11) (-1.05)   (-1.15) (-1.97) (-0.75) 
Morningstar Rating T-1  0.12
**
  0.15
***
  0.18
***
    -0.10
**
 -0.13
*
  -0.23
***
 
 (2.54) (2.82) (3.24)   (-2.13) (-1.76) (-3.12) 
∆Morningstar RatingT-1 0.09
*
  0.15
**
  0.22
**
    -0.14
***
  -0.11
**
  -0.20
**
 
 (1.74) (2.35) (2.44)   (-3.06) (-2.47) (-2.33) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.25 0.22 0.29 
  
0.23 0.21 0.26 
N 28,032 28,032 28,032   28,032 28,032 28,032 
   
Panel B: Fees and Holding Period Returns 
 
Dependent Variable ∆%WaiverT  
Partition Variable Full Sample  
		  

		 
Model/Partition (1)  Low Mid High L-H  Low Mid High L-H 

		  -0.20
***
   -0.31
***
  -0.25
***
  -0.21
***
  -0.10
**
   -0.27
***
  -0.17
***
  -0.12
**
  -0.16
***
 
 (-2.86)  (-4.09) (-3.62) (-3.20) (-2.43)  (-3.56) (-2.64) (-2.18) (-2.92) 

		  -0.18
**
   -0.29
***
  -0.25
***
  -0.16
***
  -0.14
***
   -0.24
***
  -0.26
***
  -0.16
***
 -0.08
*
 
 
(-2.58)  (-3.90) (-3.60) (-2.99) (-2.64)  (-3.69) (-3.52) (-2.78) (-1.94) 

		  -0.19
***
   -0.30
***
  -0.22
***
  -0.14
**
  -0.16
***
   -0.33
***
  -0.18
***
  -0.15
**
  -0.18
***
 
 (-2.70)  (-3.63) (-3.13) (-2.19) (-2.89)  (-4.20) (-2.64) (-2.54) (-2.93) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.24  0.27 0.24 0.26  
 
0.29 0.23 0.20  
N 28,032  26,144 26,144 26,144   21,007 21,007 21,007  
Controls Yes  Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
 
Interpretation: End return related improvements in HPRs increase investor demand. Mutual fund managers respond to this 
increase in demand by increasing mutual fund fees via waiver reductions. 
   
Figure 1 
Sample Advertisements 
This figure depicts sample advertisements that feature HPRs (Panel A) and do not (Panel B). 
Panel A: Featuring HPRs 
 
  
   
Panel B: Excluding HPRs 
 
